Navy-Congressional interactions and the response to mission budgeting by Henning, Peter John
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1977
Navy-Congressional interactions and the response
to mission budgeting.
Henning, Peter John

















Thesi s Advisor: E. J. Laurance
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
^ T 17933





1 REPORT NUMBEH 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.
4. TITLE i'«ii SumtUlm)
Navy-Congressional Interactions and
the Response to Mission Budgeting
7. *uTHOHf<;
Peter John Henning
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND AOORESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940





I. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUM8EA
I TYRE OF HEFOUT 4 PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
March 1977
• • PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
i. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA * WORK UNIT NUMBERS
12. REPORT DATE
March 1977
19. NUMBER OF PAGES
120
14 MONITORING AGENCY NAME A ADDRESS/1 !/ ailtarani from Controlling Olllem)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
It. SECURITY CLASS, (al th>» riport)
Unc I ass i f ied
TJT OECL ASSl F| CATION/ DOWN G RABIN G
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (o< mi* **patt)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
ft. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ml (A* «*«>r»«r mnt+r*4 In •>••* 20, II *i!n*r+nt «tw R**ort)
18 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Cmntlrx— an rararta *n~ II n*c**t«rr mn4 HmmHPf *r Mot* nummmr)
Navy Congressional interaction Congressional Committee staffs
PL 93-344 Office of Legislative Affairs
Mission budgeting Congressional Budget Control
National priorities
Congressional Committees
20. ABSTRACT (Canllm— an rmrmm* »/*• II nac**«a>y 4n4 I4mn*ltr <f M««A— tir)
This thesis investigates the extent and nature of Navy-Congressional
interactions, using a comparison of Congressional expectations to what
actually occurs as a means to determine a level of effectiveness for the
organization discussed. Data was gathered by use of interviews with
Congressional staff and executive department personnel.
Among the conclusions reached is that the Navy organization designed
to interact with Congress is effective in assessing and meeting
DD | '^"j 1473 EDITION OF 1 MOV • IS OBSOLETE
(Page 1) S' N 0102-014-8601 i SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whmn Dmim Mnlt

J, :il U)TV Cl A4<lFlC * TiQH Of This t> » G fc , »-»> ,n H
Congressional expectations subject to certain external constraints.
Factors seen as contributing to this overall effectiveness are the
caliber of people staffing the organization investigated, and en-
vironmental considerations such as mounting Congressional concern
over the trend in Soviet shipbuilding vis-a-vis that of the United
States.
With regard to Mission budgeting it was found that Congressiona
expectations in terms of format and content could be assumed identi-
cal to those of a small group centered on Senator Chiles. The
overall level of Congressional interest in the requirement itself
however, does not match that of this small group, as the Congress
has historically relied upon line-item, rather than a programmatic
approach to budgeting.
DD Form 1473




S/ N 0102-014-6601 secu-ity clMU'ication or this p-gci-*.- o-r- «--f.«<*>
2

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Navy-Congressional Interactions
and the
Response to Mission Budgeting
by
Peter John Henning
Lieutenant, Un ifefr States Navy
B.S., Lehigh University, 1969
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






This thesis investigates the extent and nature of Navy-Congressional
interactions, using a comparison of Congressional expectations to what
actually occurs as a means to determine a level of effectiveness for the
organization discussed. Data was gathered by use of interviews with
Congressional staff and executive department personnel.
Among the conclusions reached is that the Navy organization designed
to interact with Congress is effective in assessing and meeting Congres-
sional expectations subject to certain external constraints. Factors
seen as contributing to this overall effectiveness are the caliber of
people staffing the organization investigated, and environmental con-
siderations such as mounting Congressional concern over the trend in
Soviet shipbuilding vis-a-vis that of the United States.
With regard to Mission budgeting it was found that Congressional
expectations in terms of format and content could be assumed identical
to those of a small group centered on Senator Chiles. The overall level
of Congressional interest in the requirement itself however, does not
match that of this small group, as the Congress has historically relied
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PREFACE
This thesis assumes that the reader has a basic knowledge of the
budgetary process, and is familiar with such terms as authorization
and appropriation. Should this not be the case, a glossary immediately
follows which is intended to provide definitions of the more important
and' frequently used terms encountered herein.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Agency mission: The basic end-purposes of an agency.
Appropriation: An act of Congress permitting Federal agencies to incur
obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury
for purposes stated in authorizing legislation.
Authorization: An act of Congress that (I) sets up or continues the
legal operation of a Federal program or agency for a
stated or indefinite period or (2) sanctions a particu-
lar type of obligation or expenditure within a program.
It constitutes Congressional approval for the subsequent
appropriation of funds. Or to paraphrase a frequently
heard example: Authorization is like a hunting license,
but you cannot shoot bear until the gun has been appro-
priated.
Budget authority: The authority provided by law to enter into govern-
ment obligations which ordinarily result in outlays of
publ ic funds.
Budget committees: These are the two new committees (Senate Budget Com-
mittee and House Budget Committee) created under the
auspices of PL 93-344 which are intended to coordinate
the Congressional effort to regain control of the
Federal budget by considering both revenues and expendi-
tures in the budget formulation process.
Budget line item: An item specifically identified in an agency's budget
submission or supporting justification data which does
not have a general mission orientation.
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
(PL-93-344): This law represents a most significant attempt by the
Congress to regain control of the Federal budget. The
fragmented manner in which Congress had come to consider
the budget and the mounting Congressional dependence upon
the executive budget as a baseline all contributed to the
enactment of this law. The catalyst however which pro-
vided the final impetus it needed for passage was the
extensive use of the power to impound funds exercised
by President Nixon. Thus only when it became obvious
that Congress was losing the "power of the purse" to the
executive was the environment suitable for the drastic
reform measures embodied in PL-93-344. The law created
budget committees (mentioned above) and the Congressional
Budget Office (cited below). In addition it ca I led for
a revised time-table which calls for the new fiscal year

to begin on each October 1st. There are numerous dead-
lines such as May 15 for a "First Resolution" and
Sept. 15 for a "Second Resolution". These Resolutions
are tentative budgets, which become firmer as the Oct. I
date approaches. Finally a deadline of Sept. 25 is
specified as the time that reconciliation between the
two resolutions must be complete. This timetable repre-
sents a vast departure from prior practices and was met
with much skepticism both within Congress and by its
observers. To the surprise of almost everyone however,
the timetables have essentially been met, speaking well
for the current health of the Budget Committees, Congres-
sional Budget Office, and basic intent of the new law.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO): This office was created under the
auspices of PL-93-344 and is intended to provide Congress
with analytical capabilities similar to those provided
the executive by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB).
Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP): The control document in the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System which delineates
the Defense Department programs. See Figure 8 (p. 70)
for a listing of the ten major categories.
Mission area: Any subordinate purpose, sub-mission, segment or part
of an agency's mission stated in end-purpose terms.
Mission need: A problem, deficiency, or lack of capability identified
in an agency mission. Mission needs arise and are
identified in various ways. They may result from an
operational deficiency, a new technological opportunity,
or changes in the operating environment. They are
expressed independently of any program solution.
Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS): The process introduced
by Secretary of Defense R. S. McNamara which attempted
to apply systems analysis techniques to evaluate alterna-
tives in a rational manner. A program structure as
specified in the Five Year Defense Plan was also imple-
mented to aid in this process.
Program An organized set of activities directed toward a speci-
fied and affirmed purpose, objective, or goal, and under-
taken by an agency to carry out its mission responsi-
bi I i t ies.
Reprogramming actions: Changes in the application of financial resources
from those originally contemplated and described in agency
budget submissions that are approved by the Congress.
Reprogramming actions provide some funding flexibility to
executive agencies, but are subject to certain agreed upon
restrictions that permit cognizant congressional committees




CBO Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
DOD Department of Defense
FY Fiscal Year
FYDP Five Year Defense Plan
GAO General Accounting Office
HAC House Appropriations Committee
HASC ' House Armed Services Committee
HBC House Budget Committee
HEW Health, Education and Welfare
NAVCOMPLIA Navy Office of the Comptroller, Appropriations
Committees Liaison
OLA Navy Department Office of Legislative Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OP-906 Naval Operations Congressional Office and Policy
Coordination Branch
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
SAC Senate Appropriations Committee
SASC Senate Armed Services Committee
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I . I NTRODUCT 1 ON
The Congressional role in determining the future course of the Navy
cannot be overestimated. In terms of the budget, 33$ must now be
authorized (with efforts in progress in the House to increase this to
100$), all of it must be appropriated, and with the emergence of the new
Budget Committees, the entire budget is subject to more thorough
scrutiny than ever before, as these committees will strive to limit the
overall size of the budget thereby further enhancing the competition
for increasingly scarce dollars. It is within this environment which
the Navy seeks to optimize the effectiveness of its relationships with
Congress. A fundamental assumption used in this research to ascertain
the level of effectiveness achieved by the Navy is that the environment
is not one that may be strictly described as rational. Rather it is
assumed to be a combination of the three conceptual models (rational,
organization, and political) which Allison describes at length in "Con-
ceptual models and the Cuban missile crisis" PD» Thus what cannot be under-
stood in a strictly rational context becomes plausible from an organiza-
tional/political viewpoint. Assumptions and models aside, Congress has
sought to reassert its responsibilities with regard to shaping foreign
policy by increasingly considering the foreign policy implications of
the defense budget. For example, much has been written concerning the
rejection of the FDL primarily because it offered a means of rapid re-
sponse which was more likely to embroil the U. S. in an increased number
of brushfire wars that it otherwise would not be involved in [_2~}.

The mechanisms whereby Congress has sought an increasing role in de-
fense policy making have been noted by Laurance [25], Kanter [22], and
Korb [24]. It is generally agreed that the days of "rubber stamping" the
defense budget have disappeared in the wake of the Vietnam conflict and
the emergence of a legitimate "ant i -defense" block in the Congress.
There seems to be a genuine desire within the Congress to become active-
ly involved in the budgetary process via a programmatic framework.
As further testimony to this desire, the Budget Committees already
mentioned were created by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Con-
trol Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) which is described at great length
by Gates and Prose 5]. This new Budget Act is of significance to the
Navy as we I I as to a I I other executive agencies, as a basic goal of the
Act is to establish priorities among the competing agencies in an attempt
to control the Federal Budget. While the history of the budgetary pro-
cess shows that this has been a goal for some time this new Act repre-
sents the most exhaustive and. earnest attempt thus far.
Congress was originally organized to consider the budget on an over-
all basis. The Ways and Means Committee in the House (1795) and the
Finance Committee in the Senate (1816) were the committees having respon-
sibility for both revenues and appropriations. This worked until the
Civil War necessitated changes which created appropriations committees
in both houses. From this point on, reform has been an attempt to regain
the Congressional control of earlier years. In 1912 the Taft Commission
on Economy and Efficiency recommended that a comprehensive budget be pre-
sented to Congress by the President. This recommendation was ultimately
incorporated into the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which specified
that an executive budget be submitted to Congress each year along with
15

establishing the Bureau of the Budget (now OMB) and the General Account-
ing Office. The Bureau of the Budget was to aid the President in pre-
paring the annual Federal budget while the General Accounting Office was
to help Congress in discharging its oversight function by conducting
after-the-fact audits designed to insure expenditure of public funds met
with Congressional expectation and approval. While it is clear that
this Act helped the executive branch to centralize its budgetary process,
the more or less fragmented array of Congressional committees that dealt
with the budget were left undisturbed. Thus the executive was given the
responsibility and the means of determining at least the "first-cut" of
the Federal budget each year. In the years that passed, and as the
executive expertise grew in this area, the Congress came to depend more
and more upon this executive budget as their baseline. Furthermore, Con-
gress lacked the tools as an institution to compete with the Bureau of
the Budget. Even the GAO was primarily designed to conduct audits, and
not to prepare budgets. Congress realized this inability to create a
budget independent of the executive and attempted to change this situa-
tion in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 which created a Joint
Committee on the legislative budget intended to serve this purpose. Lack-
ing the resources available to BOB, and the political power needed to
reconcile divergent Congressional interests, the effort failed. The
Budget became increasingly less manageable and out of control, as far as
Congress was concerned.
An example of this is found in a paper by Crecine and Fischer L~8_]
which defines "The Great Identity." The Great Identity is simply that
Total Federal Revenues + deficit or Surplus = DOD expenditures + non-DOD
expenditures, or put even more succinctly "a deficit results when
16

expenditures exceed revenues." Unfortunately the realization of the
Great Identity is a necessary but insufficient condition to result in a
balanced budget. This is because the demand for our resources exceeds
the existing supply and as yet there has not emerged a disciplined means
of allocation that acknowledges this.
The result is that the national debt continues to increase at an
alarming rate to its present total of 750 billion dollars, which in
FY 1977 necessitated an expenditure of 40 billion dollars for interest
a lone.
To recognize and to implement the so-called "Great Identity" relation-
ship is a purpose of the Congressional Budget Committees and budget office
created under the auspices of PL-93-344. Thus the Budget Committees are
given the broad authority required to consider the budget as a whole
while the Congressional budget office is designed to provide the Congress
with analytical capabilities comparable to those provided to the executive
branch by 0MB.
Among the many changes wrought by the Act there are several which
directly affect the Navy, such as the need for a current services budget,
year-ahead requests for authorizations, and "mission and program budgeTs."
The requirements for the latter and the response to these requirements
will be used as a specific example in examining Navy-Congressional inter-
act ions.
It cannot be denied that the relationships between the Navy and Con-
gress are highly complex and dynamic, and that the new Budget and Reform




Formal interaction between the Navy and the Congress occurs in hearings,
briefings, and when responding to official requests for information. The
major committees involved in these interactions are the Armed Services
Appropriations, and new Budget Committees.
The intent of this thesis is to explore the extent and nature of
these interactions, with emphasis on the Navy and DOD response to the
"mission and program budget" requirement of PL-93-344 (see sect. 601 (i)).
Four years ago, prior to the enactment of Public Law 93-344, a similar
study was conducted by Berry and Peckham [6]. There have been additional
studies including two "Handbooks for Navy Witnesses Appearing before
Congressional Committees" \2Q, L~28_l. This investigation is intended to
provide a "snapshot" of the current attitudes, expectations and relation-
ships associated with the Congress iona I -Navy interactions. It must be
emphasized that such a snapshot runs the risk of obsolescence in view of
the dynamic realities of the environment under examination. Hopefully
this study will uncover some of the basic forces at work which serve to





The previous section has demonstrated why it is so important for the
Navy to effectively communicate its requirements to a revitalized Congress,
In order to satisfy this need the Navy handles its legislative affairs
through a special internal organization which will be discussed in the
next section.
In judging the effectiveness of this organization in dealing with
Congress, this thesis will use as a yardstick the degree to which the
Congressional expectations of this organization are met. Thus, what
occurs can be compared with what is expected. Also the extent to which
these expectations are recognized will be discussed. This procedure was
chosen because it emphasizes the importance of Congressional desires,
and it is the goal of the Navy tc meet these expectations to the extent
practicable. It must be emphasized that throughout this investigation
the temptation to view the action of this organization as if it operated
in a vacuum devoid of "guidance from above" was shunned.
Once the procedure of comparing realities with expectations was
chosen, interviews were conducted with particular emphasis given to the
Naval Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), Navy Office of the Comptroller,
Appropriations Committee Liaison Office (NAVCOMPLI A) , Navy Policy Coordi-
nation Branch of the Director of Navy Program Planning (OP-906), House
Armed Services Committee (HASC), House Budget Committee (HBO, House
Appropriations Committee (HAC) , Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC),





and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The individuals interviewed,
the majority of which were staff personnel or middle managers, were all
asked a series of questions (see Appendix A) to which they responded
with their candid comments. It then 'became necessary to interpret these
responses in a consistent and impartial manner. Therefore, while this
effort is albeit qualitative, it is not merely a single point of view,
but rather represents the painstaking synthesis of the many expert
opinions gathered throughout the research. Additionally, care has been
taken to include the current expert opinions encountered during the
literature search when deemed appropriate to further substantiate or
illuminate a particular observation brought forth during one or more
i nterv iews.
2
^"Any views or implications drawn from this research effort are
therefore the sole responsibility of the author.
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lit. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE
NAVY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
Figure I shows the Washington headquarters organization for the De-
partment of the Navy. The chart has been modified to show where Nav-
CompLia, OP-906, and the system command legislative offices belong.
Figure I depicts the formal organization which is designed to discourage
unauthorized personnel from lobbying in Congress in pursuit of their
particular interests. •
Figure 2 is a condensation of Figure I showing which portions of
the Navy organization service the various Congressional Committees.
Figure 2 also shows the effect that DOD has on the organization as we I I
as depicting a sample "end-run" which circumvents normal channels of
communication. This end-run is frequently used despite the existence
of the formal organization shown in Figure I. The ultimate "end-runner"
is Adm. Rickover as will be discussed in later sections.
It is important to note that OLA works directly for SECNAV while
NAVCOMPLIA reports to ASN for Financial Management via NAVCOMP. There-
fore neither OLA nor NAVCOMPLIA work directly for the CNO. It is an
explicit duty of OP-906 to insure that any out-going information is con-
sistent with CNO policy. OP-906 receives "taskings" from OLA and NAV-
COMPLIA which require that specific information be provided. OP-906
then tasks the pertinent OPNAV action addee. Any formal written response
is then processed back through OP-906 to insure that its content reflects
Figure I appeared in the book "On Watch" by Adm. Zumwa I t (ret).
The serious student of Navy-Congressional affairs should read "On Watch"
as it offers a rare glimpse of these relationships at a level which is






























































current CNO policy. Often such taskings are extensive and time consum-
ing requiring the aggregation of information arriving from various
branches of OPNAV. For example information relating to the current
size and projected growth of the U. S. Navy was requested by the CBO in
order to prepare a paper which presented various options for future
size B&L The information required for a suitable response is not only
extensive, but its intended use has far-reaching policy implications.
In addition there are probably assumptions that are associated with the
data which themselves have policy implications, for rarely are numbers
completely objective. Thus these taskings that are processed by OP-906
are by no means trivial. OP-906 also maintains a "back-up file" contain-
ing some 400 point papers which provide an updated status of all on-going
programs for CNO, as well as writing the roughs for a major portion of
the yearly posture statement. For the purposes of this report however,
the policy coordination branch of OP-906 is of more interest.
Another observation to be made is that all of the committees of in-
terest except Appropriations deal directly with OLA, while Appropriations
have a separate organization, NAVCOMPLIA, designed to serve them. The
reason for this separation is that the Appropriations Committees prefer
to work directly with people who can provide line- item information as
opposed to programs and policy information. Thus NAVCOMPLIA was created
and is maintained at the request of these committees.
There are duties other than clearing and following requests for infor-
mation that OLA and NAVCOMPLIA assume, and these deal primarily with
hearings and briefings. HeaxJjigs are formal sessions where Committee
members question witnesses about specific items, general items or both.
Briefings are less formal, and are held to inform a small croup of Con-
gressmen or professional staff people about more specific or detailed
25

program information. Both hearings and briefings are of great fiscal
importance to any program. Representatives of OLA attend all hearings
and briefings of Congressmen, their staffs, and Congressional Committees
other than Appropriations. They prepare summaries of these hearings and
briefings and send copies to SECNAV, ASN, CNO, VCNO, and OP-906. These
summaries include a list of attendees, and an account of what transpired.
OLA representatives try to obtain a list of potential attendees, and an
idea of what type questions will be asked in advance of all hearings and
briefings. This latter information is used to aid in preparing witnesses
who appear before Congressional Committees. NAVCOMPLIA assumes a similar
role for the Appropriations Committees with respect to hearings and
Driefings. However it is somewhat limited in this role as compared with
4
OLA by a manpower constraint.
The role of preparing witnesses for hearings and briefings is a
critical one, as a major conclusion drawn by Berry and Peckham, and one
which has intuitive appeal, is that a poor presentation in either instance
could result in future program cuts.
Some preliminary implications may be drawn from the structure thus
far described. First the existence of NAVCOMPLIA is testimony to the
fact that the Navy seeks to be responsive to Congressional desires (as
it may be argued that OLA and NAVCOMPLIA should be combined in the in-
terest of more efficient operations) as well as to the power of these
Committees. Second, OLA and NAVCOMPLIA are designed to provide rapid and
accurate response to Congressional requests for hearings, briefings, and
At the time of this investigation OLA consisted of over 60 personnel





information. OP-906 exists to insure that this response is consistent
with CNO policy. Thus "where you stand depends upon where you sit" is
very much at work in the organization described, as it is not too dif-
ficult to imagine situations where the rapid and accurate response
needed by OLA or NAVCOMPLIA will run counter to CNO policy or DOD policy
with which CNO must concur.
These frequently diverging goals, rapid and accurate response on one
hand, and information consistent with CNO policy on the other, are an ex-
tension and result within the executive department of the separation of
powers existing in the government as a whole. OLA a'nd NAVCOMPLIA must
work more closely with Congress than the rest of the organization shown
in Figure I if they are to be effective. It was found that these diverg-
ing goals within the executive department caused minimal problems that
were handled effectively. Indeed it is the much greater intensity of the
Congress iona I -Executi ve adversary relationship ' n general which is the
source of the major problems encountered, and which originally pointed
to the need for the very organization analyzed. This Congress icna I -execu-
tive tension heightens at budget time, and it is particularly intense
with respect to the DOD budget, as that budget has been increasingly
5
viewed as the major "controllable" portion of the entire Federal budget.
Whether or not one agrees with this viewpoint does not lessen the increased
scrutiny the defense budget is subject to as a result that it is held by
many. Thus the entire organization shown in Figure 2 seeks to minimize the
5
A controllable expenditure is one that may be significantly altered
by the Congress on a yearly basis where uncontrollable expenditures are
those which have been authorized by previous legislation and cannot be
altered without changing current law. Interest in the national debt is
generally viewed as totally uncontrollable. For a discussion of control-
lability, uncontrol labi I ity and the relative measures of each see [35].
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deleterious effects of the executive-Congressional adversary relation-
ship which is caused in part by competition for scarce budget dollars.
This minimization of adverse effects is accomplished by meeting to the





Much of this section may seem to many so obvious that it should be
assumed as implicit in the problem. It is the author's observation,
however, that much criticism of government operations in general stems
largely from a lack of knowledge of the circumstances as they actually
exist. During one interview I noticed a plaque which read "Assume
nothing." It is in that spirit which the following is information re-
garding Congressional expectations is offered.
A. KNOW CONGRESS
Congress is and considers itself to be a co-equal institution. As
an institution it therefore expects all who become involved with it to
be familiar with some of its history, mores, and daily operations.
There are some aspects of Congressional operations that are more basic
than others. For instance, the most important of all is that time is
of the essence on Capitol Hill. While this in itself is a simple-minded
concept, to present a poor brief, necessitating another visit, or to
delay in answering a question is to violate this basic premise. Thus
every attempt should be made to determine what type of questions will be
asked at a hearing or a briefing and to tailor the presentation to cover
these points. Similarly it is expected that requests for information
will be processed rapidly.
Another aspect of Congress to be aware of is the importance of the
professional sta_f_f_personne I . It has been observed that many of the
senior committee staff people have more power than the junior Congressmen
29

themselves. "Congress" then, must be extended to include these highly
important staff people who in many cases are critical in determining
the outcome of key issues. The remark that, "Congressmen are what They
eat, and the staff feeds them" is not to be taken lightly. '
Congress also expects that advice given in the past regarding manage-
ment of specific programs will be acted upon in the future. It is there-
fore necessary to be conversant with prior testimony and to be able to
provide updates upon request. Explanations as to why some advice was
not followed, if that is the case, should be readily available. This
further underscores the need to avoid a "canned" presentation when appear-
ing before a Congressional Committee.
At no time should the perceptive and intuitive abilities of the
Committee members be underestimated as the following excerpt taken from
"Politics of the Budgetary Process" attests to:
Such is the unhappy tale of the State Department official who re-
fused to admit that a Chinese language program would necessarily have
a deferred pay off in view of the fact that we had no formal diplomatic
relations with Communist China and the number of men we could send to
Formosa was limited.
Representative Rooney: I find a gentleman here, an FSO-6. He got an
A in Chinese and you assigned him to London.
Mr. X: Yes, sir. That officer will have opportunities in London
—
not as many as he would have in Hong Kong, for example.
Representative Rooney: What will he do? Spend his time in Chinatown?
Mr. X: No, sir. There will be opportunities in dealing with officers
in the British Foreign Office who are concerned with Far Eastern
af fai rs. . .
.
Representative Rooney: So instead of speaking English to one another,
they will sit in the London office and talk Chinese?
Mr. X: Yes, sir.
Representative Rooney: Is that not fantastic?
Mr. X: No, sir. They are anxious to keep up their practice....
Representative Rooney: They go out to Chinese restaurants and have
chop suey together?
Mr. X: Yes, sir.





Honesty and candor are also expected at all times. What is meant
here is not honesty in the strict sense of the word, but rather a willing-
ness to answer the question that has "reaily" been asked. That is, some
questions can be honestly answered without revealing anything, or they
can be answered in such a way as to provide material that is useful to
the Committee.
This issue of candor lies at the heart of Navy Congressional inter-
actions and clearly puts in focus the realities of the Constitutional
separation of powers. The question is really one of where do the manage-
ment prerogatives of the executive end and the oversight responsibilities
of the Congress begin? As will be seen later, in examples taken from
testimony, this issue goes unresolved, and no doubt will continue to be
so as was originally intended in the system of "checks and balances"
created by the founding fathers.
C. UNITY
As a corollary to the precept that time is very limited on Capitol
Hill, Congress expects that each executive agency will have a management
strategy resulting from internal agreement when presented to Congress to
substantiate funding necessary to implement this strategy. This applie
particularly to major programs. A genuine lack of consensus within an
executive agency when recognized as such by Congress, can only become a




V. THE NAVY RESPONSE
A. KNOW CONGRESS
In many ways the findings of this research are very much different
from those discovered four years ago by Berry and Peckham. The tran-
scripts of the interviews conducted by the latter, reveal a consistently
negative attitude regarding the effectiveness of the Navy organization
for dealing with the Congress in almost all areas. Based upon these in-
terviews their conclusions were inescapable. Adverse comments regarding
long delays, and ignorance of the legislative process were abundant. It
was felt that clearly Congressional expectations were not being met.
This was not the observation made during this investigation. This
widespread negative attitude was displaced by those ranging from "pru-
dent caution" to positive. More specifically it was felt that the indi-
viduals actually working within the Navy organization dealing with
Congress had an excellent understanding of the institution and its needs.
The majority of those interviewed felt that there was an increased aware-
ness of the importance of time and for the professional staff. There
was almost universal agreement that the extent of candor had increased.
Thus the general conclusion reached during this time frame was that the
effectiveness of the Navy organization that deals with the Congress is
excellent given the constraints which will be enumerated later.
There was of course some criticism. The number of witnesses appear-
ing before hearings and briefings was almost in every case considered to
be too large. This "overkill" was considered by some as an attempt to
intimidate while others saw it as an attempt to be responsive. Those in
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the latter group added that when too many witnesses are brought in an
attempt to insure that any question can be answered, it looks that much
worse if the desired information still cannot be provided. The comment
was made that personnel brought along for training or educational pur-
poses should always be in civilian attire. OLA and NAVCOMPLIA recognized
this problem and said that it was a continual battle to keep the number
of witnesses to a minimum. The Committee staff people verified this,
adding that after requests were made to reduce the number of witnesses,
the number would dip for a while but then always increase again. This
problem has long been recognized by the Navy in general, as a VCNO memo-
randum of 1973 directing a reduction in the number of witnesses
illustrates (Appendix B).
Delays in providing information were also mentioned in numerous in-
terviews. Concern ranged from an attitude of understanding why the delays
occurred, to one of calling for "further civilian review of the defense
establishment." Most people agreed that information was only provided
when it was in the interest of the Navy to do so, and if this were not
the case then there would be delays that were proportional in length to
the sensitivity of the information desired. Information concerning the
Shipbuilding Supplemental of September 1976 is a case in point. This
information was requested to support the "emergency" status which must
be in evidence to substantiate the approval of a Supplemental budget
fZ
It must be emphasized that "Supplemental" requests are those made
in addition to the needs expressed annually in the Presidential budget.
Prior to the enactment of PL-93-344 Congress came to expect that DOD
would submit a supplemental budget request each year, and DOD had every
reason to believe that it would be granted. A very significant result
of PL-93-344 has been to curtail the use of supplemental budget requests
unless a clear emergency exists.
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request. This proviso represents a further departure from "business as
usual" that was introduced by Public Law 93-344. It was felt that had
there been a true emergency the information would have been forthcoming,
such as that relating to the Belknap collision. This incident further
underscores the effect of the new budget Committees, as shown in a letter
dated September 20, 1976, from Brock Adams, Chairman HBC to Melvin Price,
Chairman HASC. Concerning the Supplemental request (see Appendix E for
ful I text):
Section 402 of Public Law 93-344 provides that no authorization
reported after May 15 may be considered in the House absent an emer-
gency waiver. The House Budget Committee has generally opposed
granting waivers for authorization bills reported after May 15. In
view of the fact that these ships have already been considered and
rejected by the Congress this year and no clear emergency exists, I,
as Chairman of the Budget Committee, would oppose any waiver of the
required reporting date under Section 402(a) of the Budget Act.
The information in support of an emergency situation was never provided,
and the Supplemental died in the HASC without debate. One could ask,
why didn't OLA see to it that the information was provided? The answer
may be found in Figure 2 and is labelled "DOD policies and procedures".
Thus the first constraint imposed upon the organization analyzed is that
its operation is at times regulated by high level forces within DOD.
B. CANDOR
The issue of Candor gives another good example of an additional con-
straint imposed upon the Navy organization examined. This constraint
may be summarized as the unprecedented degree of respect which Adm.
Rickover has amassed on Capitol Hill. Here are some of Adm. Rickover's
views on Candor:
Admiral Rickover. Well, the real decisions are made by the Chief
of Naval Operations, and you know that as well as I do. I can
talk to you as a nice naval officer, or I can tell you the truth
as I see it. Which way would you rather have me testify? [J3I_]
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Senator Mclntyre. The truth, sir, always, (underlining added)
Later in the same session he added:
Admiral Rickover. Of course, the essence of the strength in Congress
is that you learn to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Is that
not correct, sir? You are really a grand jury to decide because with
all of your manifold duties you cannot possibly get into every techni-
cal detail of all sorts of things discussed in your hearings.
I can say in defense of what I have said that I think I have been
a pretty credible witness before this and other congressional com-
mittees all of these years. I have had slippages. Everybody has
slippages because unforeseen events occur. But I think you will find
as far as slippages, and as far as cost overruns, I am about as good
as anyone in the Defense Department. Whether you agree with me or not,
I believe if you look back at my record over the last 20 years or so,
you will find that I have given you good testimony.
Clearly these statements serve to focus on the issue of candor as one
which involves more than honesty in the strict sense of the word. It is
the extent of candor which is really the nub. It soon became obvious
in this research effort that an investigation purporting to examine Navy-
Congressional interactions could not avoid inclusion of a description of
the unique role which Adm. Rickover himself plays. As the foregoing
testimony indicates Adm. Rickover has earned an unprecedented degree of
respect on Capitol Hill. The following excerpt from test imony before
the SASC on May 4, 1976 serves to underscore this precept:
Senator Goldwater. Admiral, I wish the Pentagon were filled with
peop le I i ke you.
Admiral Rickover. You couldn't have more than one like me , sir.
Senator Goldwater. I have a hunch we could, if we would reward
honesty, (underlining added) [33]
The Admiral's statement, "You could only have one like me, sir" is
not to be taken lightly. Consider the following information taken from
Adm. Rickover's opening statement at the May 76 hearings before the SASC:
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I have been associated with the naval nuclear propulsion program for
more than a quarter of a century during which time there have been:
13 Secretaries of Defense; 15 Deputy Secretaries of Defense; 12
Directors of Defense Research and Engineering, including former posi-
tions of Chairman, Research and Development Board and Assistant
Director for Research and Engineering; 8 Assistants to the Secretary
of Defense for Atomic Energy, including former Chairmen of the Mili-
tary Liaison Committee; 14 Secretaries of the Navy; 15 Under Secre-
taries of the Navy; II Chiefs of Naval Operations; 12 Vice Chiefs of
Naval Operations; 5 Chiefs of Naval Material since the position was
established in 1963; and 10 Commanders of the Naval Sea Systems Com-
mand, including the former positions of Commander, Naval Ship Systems
Command, and Chief, Bureau of Ships.
On the average, each of these 115 ,key officials in the approval chain
held his position a little over two years. In any given year, about
4 of these 10 top positions had a new incumbent. Since my own tour
of duty in this program spans this entire period, I undoubtedly have
a different view of the events which have occurred than do the legions
of officials I have mentioned, and their numerous subordinates
—
all
of these constantly rotating officials had to approve my requests
before I could proceed with my work. (33]
With these credentials, and with the nuclear power program as an on-going
testimony to his effectiveness, it is natural that when Adm. Rickover
speaks people listen. Clearly Adm. Rickover has obtained a unique posi-
tion which has a profound effect upon the nature of Navy-Congressional
interactions in many areas, one of which is the extent of candor which
Congress comes to expect of all witnesses. Equally clear is the fact
that he represents an external constraint to the organization examined
in that he constantly employs the "end run" shown in Figure 2 without
fear that such a path will be closed to him in the future.
In "The Politics of the Budgetary Process" Aaron Wildavsky describes
various "strategies" that are used by executive branch in order to obtain
the desired level of funding from Congress, and the potential duplicity
that these strategies introduce.
Consider the kind of duplicity that appears to be involved in the
game wherein agency people make believe that they are supporting
the President's Budget while actually encouraging Congressmen to
ask questions that will permit them to talk about what they would
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really like to have. Is this behavior immoral or does the immorality
belong to the Executive Office directive that tries to compel agency
personnel to say things they do not believe in order to support th
President ? (underlining added)
Later on the same theme he says
Taking advantage of the separation of powers and the division of
labor in Congress may seem inordinately manipulative until one asks
wnether or not there is any reasonable alternative . As things stand
now, an agency may suffer because it lacks support in one of the
Houses of Congress, in the substantive or appropriations committees,
in the Conference Committee, or in the Executive Office. The American
political system provides many detours, not to say reverses and road-
blocks. To ask the agency not to take advantage of an opportunity
for using superior strength in one of these centers of power is to
consign it to permanent impotence unless it is so fortunate as to be
loved equally everywhere. A code of conduct which states that only
the disadvantages of the system are acceptable is rather strange. [36]
(under I i n i ng added)
These excerpts are intended to show that the extent of candor in-
volves much more than honesty in the strict sense of the word and that
Adm. Rickover is pursuing the strategy which he feels will further his
programs, and ultimately the national interest. It should be emphasized
that the existence of several strategies does not mean that all are not
aimed at the same goal (end) of national security. The problem is defin-
ing the route (means) of getting there. These strategies contribute
greatly to the complexity of the Navy-Congressional interactions even
if they are generally viewed as legitimate and perhaps necessary given
the present budgetary environment, which is highly competitive.
C. UNITY
Interviews also uncovered a widespread feeling that the Navy lacked
a unified direction, particularly with respect to its shipbuilding
programs.
For example, the late Senator Hart had this to say at a SASC hear-
ing in May 1976:
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Senator Hart. Mr. Secretary, it is a little late to ask questions, but
I would like to make a couple of observations and invite you or the
other gentlemen to comment.
DIFFERING VERSIONS OF NAVY
One of the most difficult problems in dealing with the Navy is to know
which Navy you are talking about. Right now the chart shows essential-
ly three navies, the original administration Navy, that is to say, the
total several months ago; and the House Navy, which I think at least
to some degree results from information disseminated from the military
desi res', and so on; and then there is the augmented or supplemented
Administration's Navy. And I think to some degree the three navies
are the result of what you might call several other navies.
Not overly personalizing it, I think the struggle historically, between
what you could call the Rickover Navy, and with deference to Senator
Byrd, the Zumwa I t Navy . And I think the House to some degree has tried
to bridge those navies, which is why we got the bigger number from the
House.
I guess what I am saying here is that what we need is a single Navy.
I understand from your comments to Senator Culver and Senator Nunn
earlier that you are keeping a foot in the door
—
you want both navies;
you want a mix, as you say. But I don't see how we get the mix by
pursuing, if you will, a Rickover Navy, essentially, for 10 or 15 years,
and then all of a sudden, in 1976, saying, what we need is in addition,
not instead of, but in addition to the Rickover Navy, we need a
Zumwa It Navy.
So that is an observation that I want to make. I am terribly confused,
with the limitations I suggest, as to which Navy we really want and
which Navy we can really afford, (underlining added) [33]
This commentary is typical of the current widespread feelings o'n Capitol
Hill regarding a seeming lack of internal consensus within the Navy.
Indeed the belief is that there are "two Navies" for many budgetary pur-
poses. Moreover there was consensus among those ^interviewed that the
Navy "had to do something about the lack of unity" that the Congress per-
ceived. The Navy definitely feels the repercussions of this perception
as is evidenced in Table I. Note that the HASC action has been to signi-
ficantly alter the President's proposed budget in many areas. Thus this
perception is a source of continual concern to the Navy.

TABLE I
The HASC action on the FY 1977
Presidential budget for shipbuilding
FY 77 BUDGET OPTIONS












TRIDCNT t/S 702 . 1/S792
ATTACK SUBMARINE ISSN G88) 3/S 959 4/S13IG - 3/SD5S
CARRIER (CVNX) - 0/S 350 0/S350 0S353
STRIKE CRUISER (CSGW) 0/S 170 0/S 302 - 0/S170
AEGIS DESTROYER (D0G-47I 1/S 359 - - i/sec-o
UKUMlftRMeMMCI* . 0/S 37] -
AS1."; DESTROYER (DO 963) - 4/S 940 -
FRIGATE (FFG-7) 8/S1180 4/S 590 4/S521 I2/SJ701
SUPPORT SHIPS 3/S 637 E/S123S 1/S103 4/S743
USS3ELKNAP - 1/S 213 - -
CLAMS/COST GROWTH S1694 S541 - SI 694
TOTAL SHIPS 1G 21 5 21
TOTAL SCN COSTS (S MILLIONS) S6290 S7378 S974 S72G4
ADDED R&O FUNOING - - S200 'S2C3
TOTAL ADDITIONAL FY 7? S1 174 S7:C4
It is interesting to note that the 371 M. for Long Beach Conversion to
Aegis recommended by the HASC and later adopted by the SASC, was subse-
quently appropriated. These funds remain unobligated at this writing
and provide evidence that unity has not yet been achieved.
The "two Navies" concept is of course directly related to the fore-
going discussion of candor, which involves presenting the merits of
various programs as the witness actually views them. It is simply not
possible for OLA, NAVCOMPLIA, OP-906, or anyone else in the Navy for
that matter, to reconcile the opposing views that Congress receives.
It all stems again from the unique role that Adm. Rickover has assumed,
which may be illustrated again in a quote from "On Watch" in which a
student of the Washington scene remarked "Congress really doesn't think
of Rick as an Admiral at all, but kind of as a Senator." There are those
in the Navy who do not think the comparison is valid. One was Adm.
Zumwa I t who wrote:
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"As for the SSN-658 like everything in which Rickover has a hand,
it had complications leading to ramifications resulting in henanigans,
all of which I shall sketch in the next chapter." 7
It is obvious that the perception of two Navies is accurate and that
there is nothing that the organization examined here can do about it.
The sample of interviews conducted now becomes critical. There were no
interviews conducted with Congressmen or Senators themselves as the
time constraint already mentioned made it difficult enough to locate
professional staff people who were able to grant an interview. Thus
while the staff agreed that this was a problem (two Navies; two view-
points) it is not clear that the members themselves feel that way. Com-
petent as a professional staff is, there is not one that can compete
with that of Adm. Rickover. It is probable that the members maintain
Adm. Rickover as a devil's advocate To augment their technical expertise
in many areas. This would then be a classic approach to the traditional
divide and conquer strategy used by Congress in discharging its over-
sight responsibilities. They are thus assured of viewpoint which
opposes that of DOD (and the Navy), from the person in whom they have
the most faith and trust. This opposing viewpoint may then be used as
a wedge to uncover information that may otherwise remain unnoticed.
Again it must be noted that only the Congress has the power to alter this
practice.
If the reader finds this dialogue as interesting as the author does
turn to Appendix G to find comments given by Adm. Rickover concerning
"On Watch" given before the SASC May 5, 1976.
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VI. CAUSES FOR IMPROVEMENT
It has been reported that the Navy organization designed to know
and serve Congress has in many ways improved in performance from that
observed by Berry and Peckham.
! The first and primary reason underlying this increased effectiveness
is the people sta ff i ng the organization described. OLA in particular was
singled out as an organization having personnel that were highly respon-
sive to Congressional needs and desires, and who in addition could per-
form the necessary manipulations required to make things happen. The
philosophy at OLA is to choose people who have proven to be past "high
achievers" in the fleet, rather than to emphasize a formal training pro-
gram designed to teach "Congressional interaction." This philosophy is
an outgrowth of the controversy regarding on-the-job vs. formal training
and definitely favors the former with the caveat that the personnel be
essentially hand-picked. Regardless of the general controversy, the
OLA philosophy has reaped tangible benefits, as evidenced by the many
positive statements regarding the effectiveness of this organization.
The same can be said of NAVCOMPLIA, with the proviso that many individ-
uals interviewed considered the scope of their work to be more narrow
than that of OLA. That is, OLA is involved with both policy and data
whereas NAVCOMPLIA is concerned with only the latter.
"V A second set of reasons for this increased level of effectiveness
as perceived by Congress can be lumped into a category called "the en-
vironment." Clearly the general anti-defense feelings that were so
prevalent 4 years ago have diminished and been replaced in part by a

growing concern over the Soviet threat as illustrated by the following
exchange between Senator Nunn, and Adm. Hoi loway, CNO:
Senator Nunn. So if we do two scenarios, you would say in the NATO
scenario, keeping the sea I i nes open in a NATO contingency, we would
have a thin margin. In an all-out Soviet secret attack against the
U. S. Navy for the purpose of destroying the U. S. Navy, we would
not have any margin at all?
Admiral Hoi loway. Under the circumstances of a total effort by the
Soviets to destroy the U. S. Navy regardless of what consequences it
might evoke—whether such an action might be viewed by our National
Command Authority as a basis for retaliatory nuclear strike— I think
that under those circumstances there is probably a 50-50 chance cur
Navy could carry out its tasks and defeat the Soviets.
Senator Nunn. Because of that latter answer 1 find that not comfort-
ing, but I find it very discomforting. In my opinion I don't think
the American people would define our capability as superior if that
scenario takes place. [33]
As further evidence of the changing environment consider the responsive
pro-defense chord Governor Reagan struck in his recent bid for the
Republican nomination. The firing of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
and the Soviet intervention in Angola were additional examples actually
cited by Congressional staff members as events serving to alter the
general attitude toward defense from less "anti" to more "pro".
1p A third reason for this increased level of effectiveness has been
the emergence of the budget committees created by PL-93-344 as these
committees have directly impacted upon the traditional roles of the
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. In setting self-imposed
limits in the first concurrent resolution of May 15 the Budget Commit-
tees cast the authorizing committees into the potential role of defense
advocates. The rationale is that the authorizing committees will lose
power if their proposals are altered significantly by the budget com-
mittees. Efforts to work more closely with the Defense Department could
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indeed be the result of this Congressional power struggle. Thus within
Congress itself there is motivation to pursue "normalized interactions"
which further enhances the effectiveness of the organizations being
discussed. Some of the other possible effects of the new Budget Act are
addressed in the next section.
In those areas where there is still need for improvement this need
is fostered by external forces that are beyond the power of the organi-
zations examined to control. These forces simply transcend the organi-
zations discussed. Interviews acknowledged these constraints and the
need to work around them (to "move easy in harness" as Robert Frost
would say). The findings show that these obstacles were avoided to the
extent practicable, and that service was satisfactory in spite of them.
It has also become evident that an analysis of "Navy-Congressional
interactions" is a very enterprising undertaking if pursued seriously.
The need for increased expertise feeds itself. There is always one more
article to read, or one more interview to conduct in order that a "true"
image emerges. The complexity of the topic is such that the author
finds that meaningful suggestions for improvements in current procedures
are difficult to make. It can be said that such improvements would have
to be in areas that are difficult to detect or that they would involve
actions on a macro level relating to external constraints already dis-
cussed.
In order to further illustrate the complexity of these interactions
the requirement for mission budgeting (sect 601 (i) of PL-93-344) will
now be examined in the same "expectation-response" context used for de-
scription of the general interactions already given. It is possible to
offer some recommendations regarding this very limited but important re-
quirement, and this will be done in a later section.
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The reader should be advised that the Navy response to mission bud-
geting has not been substantial at this writing, for reasons which will
be enumerated in later sections. This fact does not lessen the
challenge that such a requirement will pose to future Navy-Congressional




VI I. MISSION BUDGETING - CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS
A. BACKGROUND
Enactment of PL-93-344 represents the most far-reaching and compre-
hensive attempt at budget reform ever made. In the words of Senator
Ervin, D-N.C, "This is one of the most important pieces of legislation
that Congress has considered since the First Congress." Of great inter-
est and concern is not only the size of the budget, but of course how
the resources are allocated among the various competing agencies. Mis-
sion budgeting is envisioned by many in Congress as a primary technique
whereby these priorities may be determined.
The requirement for mission budgeting is set forth in section 60 1 ( i
)
of PL-93-344:
"(i) The Budget transmitted pursuant to subsection (a) for each
fiscal year, beginning with the fiscal year ending September 30,
1979, shall contain a presentation of budget authority, proposed
budget authority, outlays, proposed outlays, and descriptive in-
formation in terms of
—
"(I) a detailed structure of national needs which shall be
used to reference all agency missions and programs;
"(2) agency missions; and
"(3) basic programs.
To the extent practicable, each agency shall furnish information
in support of its budget requests in accordance with its assigned
missions in terms of Federal functions and subf unctions, including
mission responsibilities of component organizations, and shall
relate its programs to agency missions."
In addition the law later states in Title VI i that
The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, in cooperation with the Comptroller General
of the United States, shall develop, establish, and maintain for
use of all Federal agencies, standardized data processing and in-
formation systems for fiscal, budgetary, and program related data
and information. (underlining added)
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While the requirement, and cooperation needed to meet the requirement for
mission budgeting is explicit, there is no mention made of a specific for-
mat that would be satisfactory. This is because at this point in time
a su.itable format having general acceptance did not exist. This situation
was further aggravated by the fact that the existing authorizations and
appropriations committees were not currently using a pure mission approach
and the potential to resist a move in this direction was a distinct
possibility. The feeling was expressed succinctly by one appropriations
committee staff member who warned the budget committees "no> to play with
our line items." Indeed this warning was formally issued by the HAC with
its estimates for the FY 1977 First Concurrent Resolution:
...the Committee notes with concern the tendency to identify and to
make recommendations for speci fie I ine items . While these line item
recommendations have no actual effect, they do tend to obscure the
vera I I macro-econcmic responsibilities of the Budget Commifte i and
to needlessly duplicate much of the hearings and deliberations that
are the responsibility of the authorizing and appropriations committees
.... The Committee considers decisionmaking concerning specific line
items and programs to be a responsibility of the Congress to be achievec
through the regular authorization and appropriations process . The
Committee urges that the contents of the reports on the Concurrent
Resolutions on the Budget be confined to the purposes set forth in the
Act. (underlining added)
The HBC responded in its report of the First Concurrent Resolution for
FY 1977 in this manner:
The Committee did not consider individual line items in arriving
at this estimate, but rather examined the rates of growth in purchases,
inflation rates, and the large and growing unexpended balances
currently available to the Department which may become available for
transfer under existing procedures from appropriated purposes and used
in lieu of new budget authority for funding programs proposed in the
budget Q9].
Thus actions taken by the budget committees must necessarily include an
assessment of potential effects upon the other Congressional Committees




Nevertheless a budget utilizing a mission format is required of all
executive agencies by FY 1979, and many attempts have been made to im-
plement this requirement earlier, indicating that impetus for such a
presentation definitely exists. Further analysis shows that the primary
source of this impetus is Senator Lawton Chiles (D-FL) who was a I so a
member of the Commission on Government Procurement. In December 1972
this Commission reported to Congress that it recommended a mission bud-
get approach. In 1973 Government-wide mission budgeting legislation
was introduced in the form of the "Congressional Budget Control and
National Priorities Act of 1973." (Senate report no. 93-675). This
legislation was not enacted; however, it did pave the way for Sect.
601 (i) and firmly establish Senator Chiles as an avid proponent of mis-
sion budgeting.
This Senate report (93-675) defined "agencies missions" as
(b) The term "agencies missions" means those responsibilities for
meeting national needs which are assigned to the departments, agen-
cies, and subdivisions of the executive branch. The missions of an
agency are to meet those national needs for which they are assigned
responsibility. Agency missions are defined in terms of the hierar-
chy of national needs and the hierarchy of national needs must be
matched to the missions of all agencies. [39]
Initial attempts to determine the true requirement for mission bud-
geting format in this investigation met with frustration. The require-
ment as stated in sect. 601 (i) did not specify a specific format. Fur-
ther inquiry indicated that Senator Chiles was very interested in mission
budgeting. Sen. Chiles was a member of the Government Commission on
Procurement which recommended mission budgeting and is also a member of
the Committee on Government Operations which drafted the "Congressional
Budget Control and National Priorities Act of 1973," which was the fore-
runner of PL 93-344. The author then took the simplistic view that of
one satisfied Sen. Chiles appetite for a mission budget in terms of con-
tent and format, then the requirement as vaguely described in sect. 601 (i)
wou I d a I so be sati sf ied. This is a basic assumption of this analysis
and has yet to be actually tested, although there are indications, as
will be seen, that it is valid. Thus "Congress" in this sense has been
reduced to a small group centered on Sen. Chiles for the purposes of





and cited the following as catalyst for the proposed reform:
All this makes Congress painfully dependent upon Presidential
agencies, notably OMB, for essential program and financial informa-
tion. It gets only what the executive gives, and only when the
executive gives it. This dependence seriously erodes the ability
of Congress to function as an independent institution with the dual
responsibility of establishing national priorities and controlling
expenditures. Of course, Congress generally has little trouble
finding out what the President wants; the budget itself is an ency-
clopedia of facts and preferences. But Congress often has great
difficulty extracting information about options not favored in the
President's budget. As a matter of fact, the budget is often pre-
sented and defended in a manner that thwarts the consideration of
alternative courses of action . So huge is the budget and over-
whelming the publicity marshaled in its behalf, that Congress
literally takes weeks to recover from "budget shock," absorbing the
bewildering array of information and coming to grips with the
billions of dollars of decisions. (underlining added') [39]
In this report examples involving the mission budget approach for
HEW and DOD were also presented. It should be pointed out that in
theory the mission budget requirement is one that extends to a II
Executive Agencies , and is not meant to be used as a means of harassing
individual agencies. For example, Testimony of Eliot Richardson, then
Secretary of HEW, indicated that agency was in need of change:
Here, I am—as one must be
—
deeply troubled by the sense of
failure, of frustration, of futility which pervades much of our
human resource system—much of our society. And I am thoroughl
y
:onvinced that the conceptual framework which has guided us in
past is no longer tenable .
For the foreseeable future there will remain the necessity to
fix administrative responsibility for the resolution of issues
which cut across Health, Education, and Welfare organizational
un i ts.
The Bureaucratic Labyrinth: Since 1961, the number of differ-
ent HEW programs has tripled, and now exceeds 300. 54 of these
programs overlap each other; 36 overlap programs of other depart-
ments . This almost random proliferation has fostered the develop-
ment of a ridiculous labyrinth of bureaucracies, regulations and
gu i del i nes.
The average State now has between 80-100 separate service
administrations and the average middle-sized city has between 400
and 500 human service providers—each of which is more typ ica I ly
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organized in relation to a Federal program than in relation to a
set of human problems , '
But in none of this is there a rational approach to priority-
setting. The appropriation process is itself highly fragmented
.
HEW T s resource allocation is determined piecemeal by ten different
subcommittees—with no coordination of any kind. D9]
The Congress is not organized to bring the process of budget-
ing under rational control, (underlining added)
This fragmentation of the Federal budget, at the time the report was
printed in 1974, is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the overlap
of Federal functions with Federal agencies.
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The Report went on to recommend changes in the HEW and DOD budget formats,
It is here that the first glimpse of what is meant by the "mission
gbudget" structure can be found. Figure 4 shows the alternative budget
structure proposed for defense in this report.




































































Figure 4. Alternative Budget Structure from Senate
Report 93-675
The December 1972 Report of the Commission on Government Procurement
(Part C) also provides good background information of the conceptual
framework which led to the current requirement \j>2\.
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Additional information is then provided which shows how major programs
such as Cheyenne and Trident are started and maintained without suffi-
cient visibility to Congress. Thus the intent of this Senate report
was to render more meaningful Congressional review of the executive bud-
get. Congress also wanted to enter the decisionmaking process at an
earlier point, and disliked major programs being started without consc ious
approval by Congress. Mission budgeting was to be used, in part, as a
means of changing this situation by altering the format and content of
budget submission. In addition, Congress sought to force a reconcilia-
tion of individual service perception which in their view resulted in
parochialism and in less efficient expenditures than would otherwise be
the case if mission budgeting were employed. As could be expected the
executive branch voiced "fundamental misgivings" about these requirements
particularly with respect to who would be responsible for defining the
national priorities and by what criteria. A copy of the letter sent by
OMB can be found in Appendix C; however their "misgivings" can perhaps
be best illustrated by this portion of the letter:
We subscribe to the concept that resources in the Federal Govern-
ment should be applied against national needs. However, our recent
experiences with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System and,
later, in attempting to articulate and set national goals independently
of the political process have illustrated graphically the difficulty of
being able to identify and gain agreement on a single set of national
needs that are comprehensive in scope and yet are specific enough •
allow budget based goals and objectives to be structured against the
accomplishment or fulfillment of these needs . Moreover, the specify-
ing of national needs in the formal manner specified by S. 1414 would
result in a much less flexible system than the present one, and thus
inhibit both the Congress and the Executive from being able to respond
to new needs in a timely and efficient manner. We would therefore
suggest that the requriement for the identification of program needs
not be legislated but allowed to evolve, as required, to meet the needs
of both the executive branch and the Congress. (underlining added)
While the Congressional budget control and National Priorities Act of
1973 was not enacted, the requirement for mission budgeting lives in
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PL-93-344. Moreover this requirement is very similar indeed to that
del i neated above.
C. THE PRESENT REQUIREMENT
What is a mission budget, and how does it differ if at all from the
current 5-year defense plan (FYDP) currently utilized by DOD? That
question is best answered by considering Table II which compares the
proposed mission structure with the appropriations structure and with
the Five Year Defense Plan. Figure 5 shows how replacing the appropria-
tions structure with the mission structure would render the budget a
more meaningful document in terms of output . Tables III and IV then
show a method whereby composition and trends in mission spending may
be more easily determined. Thus, from the Congressional viewpoint, mis-
sion budgeting is the only means whereby inputs may be related to out-
puts in a visible manner which will allow Congress the ability to
become involved at the critical "front-end" of the decision making pro-
cess, while at the same time providing an input to the foreign policy
implications of the defense budget.
This belief is emphasized in a letter from Senator Chiles to Senator
Muskie dated March 10, 1975. Part of the contents are as follows:
As I see the task ahead of us, we have two basic choices in the
way we approach, analyze, debate and justify the national defense
function:
(1) a "line-item" approach, devoting attention to a collection
of separate issues and weapons programs; or (far left Table II)
(2) a "mission" approach to collect all relevant programs and
activities into a complete framework of defense missions, such
as strategic offense, theater air defense, and others, (center
Table II)
Both Senator Muskie and Senator Chiles are on the Senate Budget
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I am seriously concerned that if we fall into a "line-item" pat-
tern of treating weapons and issues, we will, first, commit ourselves
to a politically inexpedient duplication of the decision making to be
made by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and, second,
more importantly, we may foreclose our unique opportunity to have the
Budget Committee provide, for the first time, a forum for examining
higher-order decisions of defense policy and strategy which can be
clearly linked to budget actions , (underlining added)
Clearly this letter reaffirms Senator Chiles commitment to mission budget-
ing. In responding, Senator IMuskie has this to say in his letter dated
12 March 1975:
I share your concern that the Committee should, on the whole,
avoid a "line-item" approach to budgetary issues. And I agree that
the Committee should seek to provide in its work a forum, as you
express it, "for examining higher-order decisions of defense policy."
1 find your suggestion that the Committee structure its work on the
Defense budget around mission objectives and mission costs a construc-
tive and attractive alternative.
Before exploring the DOD response to the mission budgeting require-
ment it is of interest to investigate what happened at HEW with regard
to the requirement. The Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations
conducted a special hearing in May 1976 to examine just this matter.
In his opening remarks Senator Chiles indicates that HEW has in fact re-
sponded adequately to satisfy the needs of the Committee:
HEW began working with the subcommittee on this mission approach
2 years ago, and in January of this year, the committee wrote Secre-
tary Mathews outlining our needs for 1977. That letter and his re-
sponse, which provided the requested mission displays, will be included
in the record at the conclusion of my remarks.
The displays, developed by HEW's comptroller, will allow us to view
the totality of programs and resources devoted to individual health
missions. At a glance, we can see precisely what our commitments is to
knowledge development, to prevention, to providing direct medical care
and to improving the capacity of service systems...
1 would like to thank you, Dr. , Cooper, for the help which various
members of the HEW staff provided in developing a format, which is
compatible with both the planning work which you have done and with
the wav we described programs here at the committee, (underlining added)
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Later in the same hearing, Senator Chiles once again acknowledges that
the HEW response is satisfactory and comments that this is not true for
the Defense Department.
Senator Chiles. I appreciate that statement, and I think it is
very helpful to us that HEW is working with us as we are trying to
develop a format for this mission approach.
I wish we could say that was happening with all of the agencies
because I think by the time that we get to 1979 we wi I I have worked
out many of the major areas of problems, and we will have worked out
something so that we a I I understand what are apples and what are
oranges within what we are talking about.
I wish I could say that the Department of Defense was that coopera-
tive with us. We have been trying to get a little help from them into
this, but we have not been able to succeed yet, but we will try again
next year . (underlining added) [34]
Events leading to this assessment by Senator Chiles will be discussed
in the next section titled "Mission Budgeting: The DOD Response."

VIM. MISSION BUDGETING: THE POD RESPONSE
In order to adequately describe Senator Chiles' negative assessment
made in May 1976 regarding the DOD response to mission budgeting, some
background is necessary. Attempts to get the information began in July
1975. (It should be remembered that the law required mission budgets in
FY 1979.)
On 18 July 1975 Senator Ho Mings as Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee Defense Task Force formally requested Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger to provide a mission budget format as soon as possible (also
see Appendix E)
:
This letter is to request that the Defense Department begin as
soon as possible to work with the Senate staff to develop such a
budget presentation. Please coordinate this effort through Senator
Chiles' representative, Mr. Lester A. Fettig.
In September of 1975 the Defense Department began an internal effort to
develop the new mission budget structure desired by the SBC. On 8 Dec
1975 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was again requested to submit the in-
formation, this time by Senator Chiles who enclosed a list of desired
categories. This list appears in Figure 6 (next page), and the simi-
larities between it and that proposed in Senate report 93-675 (Figure 4)
are stri ki ng.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld responded to this request in a letter
dated 10 Jan 1976. This letter summarized the actions taken to date in
order to respond to the Congressional requirement:
Over the months we have made available the complete details of our
program down to the program element, which is the basic building block







• Strategic command, control and communication
Tactical Warfare
• Sea control
- Naval projection and sea control



















Figure 6. Mission Structure
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made frank disclosure of the flexibilities and limitations which exist
within the present system insofar as our capability to reallocate to
your suggested mission is concerned.
We have also had discussions with the Office of Management and Budget
and with the staffs of the various interested Congressional Committees,
including the Budget Committees, on the various possible responses to
Section 601 of Public Law 93-344, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
This provision requires that the federal budget for FY 1979 be submitted
on a mission basis. As you can appreciate, this will require definition
of the views and needs of the various Congressional Committees as well
as other agencies within the executive branch .
Notwithstanding these longer range objectives, it is our intention to
be responsive to your near-term requirements. Terence E. McClary, the
Defense Comptroller, is prepared to work with you and Lester A. Fettig
of your staff to make sure your needs are met. (underlining added)
Note that this letter implies that further definition of the requirements
for mission budgeting is needed (see underlining); however this short
fall was rapidly being rectified by the SBC. The defense task force
acknowledged the past actions cited and gave further specific guidance
in a letter dated 22 Jan 1976. Some excerpts are as follows:
As a result of discussions with Mr. McClary and his staff, we
have come to an agreement that a mission budget presentation could
be presented by the Defense Department in the format submitted to
you. This format is more detailed than that provided to the com-
mittee last year. However, it conforms rather closely to the
structure now used by OSD for its own fiscal guidance...
• • •
We realize that there is uncertainty in how to best allocate
elements of overhead to specific missions, and questions on how to
best redefine the missions themselves, (underlining added)
The format that was alluded to in the letter is the same which is
shown on the previous page in Figure 6. Thus at this point there is no
longer a question as to whether or not the desired format had been com-
municated to DOD. It had been. In fact the identical format was pub-
lished in the Washington Post on March 5, 1976 as a portion of the second
of two articles concerning defense spending by Senator Chiles. It was
becoming evident however that reservations similar to those originally
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raised by OMB with respect to the ordering of national priorities were
present at the Defense Department. This feeling was formally trans-
mitted by Secretary Rumsfeld in a letter dated 6 Mar 1976 which concluded
It i s my view, therefore, that I should continue to present and
justify the Defense budget to the Congress by the appropriation
structure and major program categories already used within POD .
We will continue to work with you, the other Congressional
Committees, Congressional Budget Office, and Office of Management
and Budget to determine how this program structure should be
revised to meet the requirements of Section 601 of PL 93-344 by
the FY 79 objective date. (underlining added)
Thus it is evident why Senator Chiles had let his frustrations become
known in May 1976. The opposing viewpoints summarizing this confronta-
tion are shown in a letter sent to Secretary Rumsfeld by Senators Muskie
and Bellman. These viewpoints are as follows:
(1) DOD. A mission budget requires statistical allocation
of data by use of algorithms, and the product is not
derived directly from the DOD accounting system.
Senate Budget Committee . The use of statistical alloca-
tion algorithms is expected and acceptable to the
Committee.
(2) POD . A mission budget requires allocation of fixed as
we I I as variable costs which may invite an unjustified
conclusion that a cut in divisions permits a propor-
tionate cut in allocated support activities.
Senate Budget Committee . It is our opinion that to be
totally meaningful, fixed costs must also be allocated.
However, the Budget Committee does not recommend speci-
fic cuts or increases in such things as divisions or
wings. That is the responsibility of the Authorization
and Appropriations Committees.
(3) DOD. A mission budget provides data useful for macro-
ana
I
ytica I purposes but not for financial control due
to the allocation requirements.
Senate Budget Committee . The Budget Committee evaluates
budget data in macro-analytical terms.
(4) DOD. Submission of mission budget information for
Fi sea I Year 1978 introduces mission categories before
views of OMB have been considered.
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Senate Budget Committee . The Committee recommends that
as the requested information is prepared, the DOD discuss
the effort with OMB, and the Committee staff will also
work with OMB in this regard.
( 5 ) DOD . A mission budget provides data that could be mis-
understood or misused .
Senate Budget Committee . The Committee staff believes it
thoroughly understands the DOD budgetary system, and
there is little likelihood that a misunderstanding or
misuse of the data would be made by the Committee ,
(under I i n i ng added)
The letter went on to say that the SBC had voted unanimously in the
spring that DOD should provide a mission budget for FY 1978 despite
the fact that the law had previously set FY 1979 as the deadline. An
enclosure to the letter (see Appendix D) provided the desired structure
which is again essentially that shown in Figure 6.
Thus the DOD response, and hence Navy response, to mission budget-
ing has not been one which merits high marks from Congress. The valid-
ity of this strategy will be discussed later. For the purposes of
analyzing the Navy response to this requirement however, what has been
described so far provides a fine example of what the "DOD policy and
procedures" input in Figure 2 means. The point is that the Navy is
constrained by DOD policy and is unable to respond to a requirement
until the nature of that response has been first defined and approved
by DOD. Hence the actions taken by the Navy in response to the mission
budgeting requirement have been minimal.
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IX. WHY HAS THE POD RESPONSE FALLEN SHORT?
It must be first pointed out that while the DOD response is current-
ly short of Congressional expectations, the original requirement was
for FY 1979 which explains in part some of the lassitude described in
the last section. There are numerous other reasons however, five of
which have already been listed on the previous pages. The concern that
a mission budget will be misused (number 5) and hence become a means of
justifying cuts in the defense budget is one of the strongest objections,
For example in the article published in the Washington Post (5 March
1976) already mentioned, Lawton Chiles says of the present appropria-
tions structure:
"This appropriations structure itself implicitly perpetuates
inter-service overlap and dup I icat ion . "(under I i n i ng added)
Then later with respect to mission budgeting:
" It's not hard to see that such a mission-oriented budget tells
more about what Congress should be concerned with in controlling
defense spending ." (underlining added)
This article emphasizes the negative aspects of three services
(potential overlap) without mentioning the positive aspects associated
with the competition three services creates. Alain Enthoven and Harry
Rowen argue that:
"...One of the most important things any defense allocation mechanism
should do is to help prevent gaps from appearing in our capability...
D 3t is valuable to have the separate Services 'looking for business',
trying to expand and take on new jobs.. .Human limitations being what
they are, there is good reason to believe that a decentralized
:ompetitive system, in which people have incentives to propose
alternatives, will usually meet this test more effectively than a
highly centralized system ."
j] Q (underlining added)
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It is also understandable that such a concern should surface especially in
view of the earlier discussion of the relative controllability of the
Defense budget vis-a-vis the remainder of the Federal budget. This
concern is further substantiated by those who feel that mission budget-
ing should be limited only to the Defense Department. For example one
GAO memorandum in part:
There are certain parts of the government, notably POD, where a
mission-oriented budget structure would be a clear improvement over
what now exists
., I am entirely supportive of efforts to promote
mission-oriented budgeting in those areas. Considering the history
of resistance from the Services and their friends (resistance which
neither OMB nor the White House has been willing to fight) I am not
optimistic. But I find the logic sufficiently compelling to warrant
the effort.
At the same time, I don't think the logic of pushing for
mission-oriented budgeting in POD should be generalized info a
position of saying everything in the budget should be built around
miss ions . I I (under I i ni ng added)
Clearly it should be expected that sentiments such as these will be met
with some measure of resistance. The fact that mission budgeting is
intended to be used for all agencies, as the example for HEW provided
in this thesis shows, does not insure that it will net be used by many
as a means to cut defense budgets which is exactly the cause for concern
just described. Thus mission budgeting provides yet another example of
the American political system at work. Where does management end and
oversight begin?
Still another cause for slow response lies in the possibility that
mission budgeting will become yet another budgeting format to contend
with without lessening the burden elsewhere. For example there are
currently 18 different computer languages that the Army must use in order




Table V shows these languages and their relationships with each other.
For example the program element (PE) language is the principal language
used in communication with OSD. Table V clearly shows that the PE
language interacts with all of the nine OSD languages. The Table also
shows that the PE language cannot be used to provide interaction among
all of the Army's internal languages. Thus the Army manages with its
own procedures which aggregate, and analyze in terms of units, commands,
procurement line items, development projects, and construction
projects rather than by using the PE which is the building block of
the FYDP. It is then necessary to use allocation algorithms to cross-
walk information from the PE language to that used for reporting to OSD.
These algorithms may or may not be a good approximation of "real-life"
but are used in order that a reporting requirement may be met. If the
mission budgeting format is to be meaningful the FYDP would have to be
revised in order to eliminate the allocation algorithms which would have
to be used if the current PE structure were maintained. These reserva-
tions were also listed in the five opposing viewpoints already mentioned
as nos. I and 2, p. 62.
Another factor leading to a delay in response is that the bureau-
cratic inertia associated with any change must be overcome. After all
the requirement for mission-budgeting is being actively pursued by only
the budget committees at the present time (mostly SBC), and there is no
assurance that the entire Congress is as enthused about the requirement
as are those committees. The advocacy of the HAC for line items has
already been mentioned. Also, the SASC has requested that the defense
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"Spec' f ica 1 iy, the connect ion between the p lann i ng <categories and
actua miss ions and un its in the field shou Id :e better devel ODed,
locat ons ( e.g. , overseas troops) shou Id be re lated to the various
p 1 ann i ng csitego ries and th e categories used by each Serv ice
should be consistent ." (underlining added)
It is important to note that the DPPC mission categories are not the
same as those requested by the SBC (see Figure 7) giving further
credence to the fact that Mission Budgeting will become just one more
addition to an every-burgeon i ng list of reporting requirements. At the
heart of the matter is the fact that the PE of the FYDP would have to
be significantly altered to render the mission format meaningful, and
to surmise that this change would require that a great deal of Bureau-
cratic inertia be overcome is understatement.
DEFENSE PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING CATEGORIES
STRATEGIC FORCES MISSION SUPPORT FORCES
Strategic Offensive Forces Reserve Components Support
Strategic Defensive Forces Base Operating Support
Strategic Control & Surveill.ince Force Support Training
Forces Command
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES CENTRAL SUPPORT FORCES
Land Forces Base Operating Support
Tactical Air Forces Medical Support
Naval Forces Personnel Support





Intelligence & Security Transients
Centrally Managed Communications Patients & Prisoners
Research & Development Trainees & Students
Support to Other Nations Cadets
Geophysical Activities
Figure 7. The Defense Planning and Programming Categories
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X. A POSSIBLE BENEFIT TO POD
This discussion assumes that the usefulness of the FYDP could be
enhanced through restructuring. This is primarily because the program
elements have a totally mixed orientation. Some are mission oriented,
some are functionally oriented, while still others are program oriented.
The ten major defense programs have a vertical structure (see Figure 8)
which makes it difficult to associate the functional or support pro-
grams (7, 8, and 9) with elements of the mission programs which they
support. Many values in the FYDP must be derived from allocation tech-
niques. As stated before this requires decisions to be made in non-FYDP
language and then a subsequent distribution of quantities involved back
into the PE structure. Many internal management needs cannot be satis-
fied by the basic FYDP structure as no substructure exists for cross-
walking, hence the only way to generate some information is by statisti-
cal allocation utilizing algorithms. So it is possible that through re-
structuring the 18 languages previously discussed (in relation to the
Army) could be made at least compatible, and that would allow for cross-
walking without having to rely upon algorithms. The effectiveness of
the FYDP in managing resources is lessened by vague PE titles which make
it difficult to relate resources in meaningful aggregations, such as
units and functions. Clearly a force structure orientation is needed for
each PE if the FYDP i s to be used to communicate Defense missions. A
PE substructure which further identifies resource details, such as func-
tions and elements of expense, could then be used to ensure language
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The Five Year Defense Program is comprised of ten major Defense programs
which represent the mission and support responsibilities of
the Depart-
ment of Defense. Each major Defense program is subdivided into program
elements whose mission characteristics are closely related.
The ten
FYDP programs are:
Program 1 - Strategic Forces
Program 2 - General Purpose Forces
Program 3 - Intelligence and Communications
Program 4 - Airlif t/Sealif
t
Program 5 - Guard and Reserve Forces
Program 6 - Research and Development
Program 7 - Central Supply and Maintenance
Program 8 - Training, Medical and Other General Personnel
Activities
Program 9 - Administration and Associated Activities
Program - Support of Other Nations
Programs are structured in terms of both mission objectives and supporting
objectives . Within each program mission, program elements and support
program elements are combined to permit an aggregation of the total
resources assigned to the program. Each program consists of as
many
individual program elements considered necessary to provide total
visibil-
ity to the mission or support functions of the program.
Figure 8. The FYDP Categories
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compatibility. Thus it is feasible that with such an enterprising re-
sponse, the requirement for mission budgeting could be satisfied while
at the same time increasing the effectiveness of the FYDP for internal
management purposes.
The magnitude of such an undertaking should not be underestimated.
It is possible however that such a mission format, as desired by the SBC,
which clearly I inks expenditure with mi I i tary capab i I i ty could be used
to more strongly support argument for increased rather than decreased
expenditures. For example, consider the following taken from "On Watch":
The point is that in the absence of thoughtful net assessments
no defense budget can truly be rational, and by not producing such
assessments, the executive branch has assisted in practice those it
condemns in theory, the Congressional budget cutters. Henry
Kissinger recognized the problem when he said at a meeting on 9 Novem-
ber 1 970 that " he had been trying with a spectacular lack of succes:
to get an answer to the simple question of what these |_the budgeteaj
forces could do ttlat another set of forces cannot do"—though Henry
didn't 1
i
ke the answers when he d id get th<3m. Pe rhcips the new bud-
get commi ttees of the Conqre:5S will get i ITfo this f i eld. If they
do, they will get a co 1 1 ect i ve shoe k a be)Ut whlat hias happened to this
country's defense capabilities . (underlining added)
Clearly Adm. Zumwa I t is of the mind that a mission budget specifying
actual military capabilities will lead Congress to the conclusion that
past expenditures have been inadequate to counter the threat as he (Adm.
Zumwalt) perceives it. It was evident in many interviews thai- attitude
prevalent at the highest Navy levels is that if a program does not ade-
quately contribute to national defense it should in fact be cancelled in
the national interest. In theory there is no objection to mission budget-
ing; it is just that in order to properly respond a massive change is
requ i red
.
It should be noted that the Army has generated a mission budget in
the format requested by the SBC which appears to satisfy the requirement
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upon the current PE structure which requires statistical allocation by
algorithms which was described earlier and as such is not that accurate.
It is conceivable that such a procedure could be extended to include
all the services particularly if time dictates that such a response is
the only one feasible that still satisfies the requirement.
Such a course of action does not fully capitalize on the opportunity
present to more clearly articulate defense needs while at the same time
upgrading internal management capabilities. For example consider
Figure 10 which shows a matrix of Procurement PE's vs. FYDP programs.
The current practice is to use algorithms to spread procurement costs
over 137 PE's. (This total is shown in bottom right hand corner.) The
proposed alternative would spread these costs over 24 mission oriented
PE's delineated by the X's in Figure 10. This is but one small portion
of the several alternatives that the Army is considering in order to re-
spond to mission budgeting. While the Army is currently more active in
this area then is the Navy, they are still waiting for further guidance
from DOD before responding in earnest. It will be seen in the next sec-
tion that to a certain extent DOD itself is gauging the level of overall
Congressional interest.
NOTE: Array based on FY77 co umn of
May 1976 FYDP. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
Program Element
Aircraft Procurement X X X X X
Missile Procurement












Tracked Combat Vehicles X X X X
Procurement of Ammunition X X X
Other Procurement X X X X X X X
Total 1 49 28 42 3 9 5 137




XI. MISSION BUDGETING AND PPBS
The observation that mission budgeting is merely the Congressional
answer to PPBS was voiced so often in interviews that it warrants com-
ment here. It can be argued that a fundamental difference between PPBS
and mission budgeting is that PPBS ignores that which cannot be quanti-
fied such as political considerations while mission budgeting allows
that these pressures exist, and is in fact designed to accommodate them.
PPBS has been viewed with mixed feelings by Congress. There was
significant opposition to PPBS at its inception, most notably in the
HASC under the chairmanship of Mendel Rivers. In an article which de-
scribes this situation at length Kenneth Entin writes:
This negativism was reflected in the majority's reluctance to
fully accept the merits of PPBS and centralization under McNamara .
Only three interviewees, when asked about the significance of PPBS,
addressed themselves to the inherent value of this managerial tech-
nique. All others tended to evaluate the system in terms of its
perceived impact upon particular groups, principally the military
and the committee. Committee members were inclined to interpret
centralization in a similar manner. McNamara was viewed as a
political appointee who would not hesitate to protect his own in-
terests by overruling military advice and distorting information.
In fact, this assessment is consistent with the general belief of
most committee members that centralization operates to restrict the
flow of information to the group alone formal channels from military
officials, principally the Joint Chiefs of Staff . [\ 2}
(under I in i ng added)
The article goes on to describe the "Fearless Five" minority of the
HASC who at that time were more receptive to the alleged merits of PPBS.
An unexpected source of praise for PPBS came from Senator Proxmire in a
speech he made on the floor of the Senate April 25, 1974:
Today, however, there is another issue of military improvement
and excellence I would like to address, and that is the question
of management innovation in the Defense Department. Judging by the
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past 15 years, the Department of Defense has faced and solved more
management problems with greater success than any business in the
worl
d
. I have criticized the Defense Department before and I will
do so again and vigorously. But in all fairness, they have done
well in many respects, and deserve credit for it.
It is reassuring to look back at the enormous problems the De-
partment of Defense has solved by wise management and sound deci-
sionmaking, especially since the mood of the country seems to be
pessimistic and critical of all Government bureaucracies. A review
of past and present defense management programs will quickly show
that we are making progress.
In short, the Defense Department has provided our country with
a unique broad spectrum of military capability able to defend us
from attack and operate effectively throughout the world if need
be. This could not have been accomplished without extraordinary
management innovations
. (underlining added) [29]
Clearly the "management innovations" that the Senator is referring to
is the implementation of PPBS. It could be hypothesized that the aura
of rationality that is associated with PPBS lends more credibility to
Defense Department requests thereby enhancing their chances for approva
In any event there are Congressional opponents and proponents of
PPBS regardless of any parallels that it has with mission budgeting.
Certainly one similarity that exists between mission budgeting and PPBS
is that both require the use of assumptions in order that the basic
problems be bounded. These assumptions, as related to PPBS, have been
singled out as a source of subjectivity which detracts from the rationa
approach which PPBS is purported to utilize. For instance in a paper
written for Aaron Wildavsky by Cdr. George Kinnear (now Adm. Kinnear,
Chief of Naval Legislative Affairs). The following quote is given:
In building any model, or performing any analysis, there are
certain hazards. Although well recognized, they are not easily
avoided. Mr. E. S. Quade of Rand states:
Systems analysis may still look I i ke a purely rational
approach to dec i
s
ionmaki ng, a coldly objective, scientific




It isn't really. Judgment and intuitions are used in
designing the model, in deciding what alternatives to consider
what factors are relevant, and what the inter-relations be-
tween these factors are, and what criteria to choose; and in
analyzing and interpreting the results of the analysis. Th i s
fact that judgment and intuition permeate all analysis should
be remembered when we examine the apparently precise results
that come from analysis
.
(underlining added) [23]
It is clear that the underlying assumptions can possibly prejudice the
outcomes and although this may not always happen, the ever-present
possibility is a shortcoming in itself. This theme was emphasized by
Adm. Rickover when systems analysis provided recommendations running
counter to his programs.
The Defense Department particularly has been cutting money for
submarines, which I think is dead wrong. That is due entirely to
the systems analysts . I don't know whether they are friends of
yours or not.
Senator Goldwater. Who is that?
Admiral Rickover. The systems analysts.
Senator Goldwater. I wish they would throw them all out of the
Pentagon.
Admiral Rickover. Let's shake hands on that, sir.
Senator Goldwater. I have never met one yet that could satisfy me
that he knew anything about weapons. And I am not a great believer
in cost comparability, or whatever you call it.
Admiral Rickover. But that is not in the job description. The
job description is, you must know economics and mathematics, not
weaponry.
Senator Goldwater. It would be a shame, if they knew more about
weapons we might be worse off. (underlining added) [33]
These observations were strongly countered by Senator Culver who took
quite a different view in defending the systems analysts:
Senator Culver. I was very disturbed with the references today
to the role of systems analysts, because I think given our Constitu-
tion, and our system, and civilian control of the services, that it is
absolutely unthinkable that in the absence of system analysts' help
and the independent view provided to the Secretary of Defense we can
get any kind of harmonization and rationalization out of the vicious
service rivalry and bureaucracy, and that it is almost impossible for
the taxpayer to ever conceivably fund the magnitude of the request
for every conceivable kind of weapons system, and so forth, that the
services in their own interest very logically wish to see built.
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And I don't see how on earth we are ever going to be able to get
our hands on it or in fact Congress can do its job in the absence of
a very strongly, improved capacity to make those independent assess-
ments and judgments on a cost, given that the priorities between
defense and nondefense, as well as the internal priorities of this
defense budget
,,
require that very kind of tough-minded calculation,
(underlining added) [33]
So it would seem that PPBS still has its Congressional advocates and
adversaries. Nevertheless Senator Culver's view that independent
assessment is needed in order that national priorities be properly deter-
mined goes back to the argument for mission budgeting which by law will
be required. If one ascribes to the views of Aaron Wildavsky who states
that "PPBS has failed everywhere and at all times" because the process
involves performing calculations (of which assumptions are an integral
part) that are "beyond present human capabilities" there there is concern
that mission budgeting will befall the same fate. Wildavsky reports that
PPBS is cognitively constrained and for this reason lacks the necessary
rather than sufficient conditions for it to succeed. He claims that no
one "knows how to do" PPBS and describes the chaos that befalls an agency
that makes an attempt to implement it (Appendix A).
Should mission budgeting circumvent the pitfalls of PPBS there still
exists the central problem of ordering national priorities once the
budgets have been submitted. This formidable task must be coordinated
through the budget committees who must somehow convince the remainder of
Congress that such coordination is essential. Thus just as the services
must await further guidance from DOD, so must DOD ascertain the true re-
quirement for mission budgeting. If the requirement is supported by the
entire Congress perhaps a massive restructuring of the FYDP would be
necessary. If however Congress shows, through lack of consensus, that
the requirement will serve a lesser purpose, a less comprehensive response

could suffice. There is some evidence that Congress has started a mi-
gration toward mission budgeting, particularly within the Senate where
there has traditionally been more emphasis on broad policy formulation
than in the House, where specific details involving individual programs
are considered more important. Senator Stennis, Chairman of the SASC,
indicated his support for mission budgeting in a letter sent to Senator
Chiles January 4, 1977, as this excerpt shows (see Appendix I for entire
letter with enclosure):
In light of your continuing interest and our previous conversa-
tions on the subject of mission budgeting, I thought you would be
interested that the Armed Services Committee this year is using a
new format for its hearings on the overall Defense budget and program.
This new format includes several hearings on some of the major
mission areas in the Defense Department as described by the enclosed
outline. I believe this approach would be consistent with your
thinking and should enable the Committee to quickly identify some
of the major issues affecting the budget.
It is also significant that such support from the appropriations com-
mittees (even in the Senate) has not yet been forthcoming.
Thus the assumption made earlier that "Congress" could be reduced
to a small group centered on Senator Chiles for purposes of defining
the content and format of mission budgeting does not mean that Congress
as an institution shares his commitment to insure that the requirement
is actually used. This level of institutional interest is critical in
determining the extent of the DOD response, and will be determined in
part by what linkage Congress perceives to exist between PPBS and mission
budgeting. Congress has relied heavily upon the line item approach in
the past, and Congressional opponents of program budgeting are numerous.
For Congress to pursue the concept of mission budgeting as an institu-
tion would be a greater departure from past practices than even passage
of PL-93-344 , as the former is in part the actual implementation of
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the latter. There is the additional possibility that even if Congress
requires mission budgeting as an institution, it will not be used for
its intended purpose of ordering national priorities, but instead serve
as a "pro forma" approach while the traditional line items remain the
basic budget language. The use of line items by the HAC, and the tenac-
ity with which those line items are protected from encroachment by
other committees was documented in an earlier section of this thesis
(Section VII). This is the type of tradition and bureaucratic inertia
that must be overcome within Congress if the DOD response is to be as
comprehensive as that desired by Senator Chiles. It is more probable
that mission budgeting will be used along with the traditional line
items by various "players" in establishing future budget priorities.
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XI I . CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this investigation may be summarized as follows.
1. The organization designed to formally interact with Congress is
much more effective than previously reported by Berry and Peckham
for the following reasons:
a. The people composing the organizations examined, particularly
in OLA, are aware of Congressional needs and how to satisfy them.
b. The environment within which the organization operates has become
more pro and less anti-defense, thus generally enhancing the
overall atmosphere necessary to have good Congress iona I -Navy
i nteract ion.
c. The trend in Soviet shipbuilding vis-a-vis that of the United
States has caused increased Congressional concern that the U. S.
Navy requires more support thereby enhancing the cooperative
spirit needed for favorable interaction.
d. The creation of the Budget Committees has caused the Armed Ser-
vices Committees to actively support their assessment of defense
requirements because actions to the contrary would result in
less committee prestige than was the case prior to the enactment
of PL-93-344. Thus the Armed Service Committees are able to
play off their traditional role as defense advocates against the
budget committees thereby further enhancing favorable interactions,
2. There exist "external constraints" over which the organization ex-
amined has no control. The organization examined was aware of these
constraints and worked around them to the extent possible.

3. In terms of format and content for mission budgeting, Congressional
expectations may be assumed identical to those of a small group
centered on Senator Chiles.
4. It is possible that mission budgeting could be used by DOD to both
satisfy the Congressional requirement while at the same time enhanc-
ing internal management capability by considerably changing current
program element structure and by creating a program element sub-
structure in the FYDP. This is a major undertaking that would re-
quire a consensus throughout DOD to pursue.
5. The DOD response to mission budgeting has fallen short of Congres-
sional expectations for several reasons:
a. Unless a significant effort aimed at implementing #4 above were
undertaken, mission budgeting would require statistical alloca-
tion of data involving algorithms that would jeopardize
accuracy.
b. The mission budget could conceivably be misused in attempts to
cut the defense budget.
c. The true level of Congressional interest in mission budgeting
is as yet unknown.
6. In terms of Congressional interest in mission budgeting, the views
of Senator Chiles cannot be assumed identical to those of Congress
as an institution. Congress has historically relied upon a line
item, rather than a program approach, and departure from that tradi-




The recommendations of this study are based upon the foregoing con-
clusions and are as follows:
1. In order to meet the new time table for mission budgeting set by
the SBC at FY 1978, the Army response shown in Figure 9 is adequate.
2. Efforts to improve the current program element structure and to
create a PE substructure should be pursued in order to enhance in-
ternal management capabilities by increasing the compatibility of
the various reporting languages that now exist. This effort would
also result in the availability of such information for Congress,
should the Congressional mission budget requirement become more
comprehensive in the future.
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APPENDIX A - Questions Used in Interviews
Questions
The questions fell into 2 different groups. The first group was designed
to update Berry & Peckham, while the second group was to update Gates & Prose,
Group 1
1. Are OLA or NavComplia used to prepare P.M. 's for a brief?
2. What is the effect of OP906 on the process?
3. How are the committee staffs viewed; are they considered to be important
in the process?
4. What is the extent of candor?
5. Are the "hints" that Congress gives out responded to?
6. How does the Navy compare with the Army and Air Force (A/F)?
7. Does the Navy bring too many witnesses to hearings and briefs?
3. Is information submitted in a timely manner?
9. Is the tour length of OLA/NavComplia/P.M. 's long enough?
10. Will a poor brief result in a program cut?
11. Who testifies at hearings and briefs?
Group 2
1. How have the HBC, SBC, and CBO changed Congress and its interaction with
the Navy?
2. What is impact of current services budget?
3. What will happen in the realm of Mission Area Budgeting (MAB)?
4. How will reprogramming and supplemental be handled?
5. Will back door spending be curtailed?
If it is decided to interview Project Managers (P.M. 's) then the following
questions will be asked:
1. Do you use OLA/NavComplia?
2
.
Are murder boards helpful?
3. What do you think about SARS?
4. How important are staff members?
5. What are your procedures when dealing with Congress?
6. What are your views of the authorization and appropriation process?
7. Who speaks for your program?
8. What do you think the effect of the new Budget Committees has been?
A list of some abbreviations that are often used :
OLA - Office of Legislative Affairs
NavComplia - Naval Comptroller Liaison Branch
CBO - Congressional Budget Office
HAC - House Appropriations Committee (Subcommittee for Defense)
HASC - House Armed Services Committee
HBC - House Budget Committee
SAC - Senate Appropriations Committee (Subcommittee for Defense)
SASC - Senate Armed Services Committee
SBC - Senate Budget Committee
F.P. - Foreign Policy
MAB - Mission Area Budgeting
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350 IN REPLY REFER TO
APPENDIX B - VCNO Memorandum of
a Reduction in the
at Hearings
OP-9 06/sw
1973 Cai I ing for Ser 42P90
Number of Witnesses 9 JAN 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DISTRIBUTION LIST
Sub j : Congressional Hearings for FY 74 Budget
1. In the- past the various Congressional committees that
conducted hearings in support of their deliberations on the
Navy portion of the budget have conpl a 3 n ^d ^b^if th^ lar^e
number of witnesses that, attend each briefing s ession.
2. To try to meet this honest concern of Congress and to
thereby improve the Navy image you are asked to hold your
backup witnesses to the bare minimum. As a policy you should
have not more than one backup witness for each budget activity
or primary weapons system within your program.
3. Any request for deviations from this policy should be
submitted to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations through the
Congressional and Policy Coordination Branch (OP-906)
.
4. Please insure that all of your personnel who may be called





























APPENDIX C - A Letter from OMB to Senate Committee
on Government Operations Dated
January 16, 1974
Executive Office of the President.
Office of Management and Budget.
Washington. D.C.. Junitary 16. 19? !+.
Hon. Sam J. Ervin. Jr.,
Chairman. Committee on Government Operations. U.S. Senate. New
Senate Office Building. Washington. D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman : This responds to your invitation to comment
on S. 1414. a bill "To strengthen congressional control in determining
priorities of appropriations and expenditures by requiring the budget
to be organized and submitted on the basis of national needs, agency
programs, and basic program steps."
As stated in the bilk, one of the prima ry purposes of S. 1414 is "to
reformulate the structure of" tKe~buaget tonighnght national needs."
ThlTbi ll would require that_the Director of OMB, under the direc-
tiojf.of the President and In cooperation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Comptroller General, and the Director of the Office of
Goals and Priorities Analysis, "specify a hierarchy of national needs"
ancl "reconcile and assign the responsibilities of the various agencies to
meet the national needs so specified." v^ p harp fun f"pmr'nfil *—g-"—-
" g£ "™posed rpnuirernpnts.
e are seriously concerned that reformulating the structure of the
budget in the manner required by S. 1414 would, if it were feasible,
weaken the system of checks and* balances that is so essential to our
form of government. History has proved many times over the wisdom
of our founding fathers in designing a Federal Government in which
there is separation of power and in which the setting of priorities is
the unmistakeable responsibility of elected officials—the President and
the Congress. Bj^placjflg thejjesponsibility for specifying a hierarchy
of national needs on the Director of OMB and requiring that he do so
inxooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury and two Legislative
iM'Hiitii omcials, &. 1414 would—simultaneously—dilute separation of
power sig^ ""cantly and place too much of the responsibility for prior-
ity Scttin*
,
to the hands of appointed officials in both the executive
antjLlegisIative branches. Setting priorities in this way would .cause
a basic change in the political processes of our Xation. Such an alter-
ation of our fundaniental^u'ocess should no t be cousjdered .
i i^iM>We believe that the basic objective of S 1414: "To strengthen con-
gressional control in determining priorities of appropriations and
expenditures." can be achieved better in other * ays. Indeed, we believe
that S. 1541. which your Committee reported out in the first session
of the 93rd Congress, would achieve this objective without having the
adverse consequences of S. 1414.
Our reservations about the desirability of enacting S. 1414 are not
lessened by our conviction that establishing a hierarchy of national
needs in the manner prescribed is not feasible. Any attempt to rank
national needs would require initially a determination of criteria on
which to base the ranking. Both the establishment of criteria and the
determination of rankings is likely to result in enormous controversy.
That controversy would make it virtually impossible to reach appro-




We subscribe to the concept that resources in the Federal Govern-
ment should be applied against national needs. However our recen t
experiences with the Planning, Programming. Budgeting System a nd,
later, in attempting to articulate and set national iron independently
of the .political 'process h a ve illustrated graphically the difficulty of
being able to identify and ga in agreement on a single set of national
npeds that are comprehensive in smnp and ypr arc specific pnoncrh
to allow budget bag^d
,
flflajg finrl objectives tn JMu^taiUifaUisd ""^'pgt
the accomplishmpnt or fulfillment nf tlipeo needc \fnrenver the speci-
fying of national needs in the formal manner specified by S. 1414
would result in a much less flexible system than the present one. and
thus inhibit both the Congress and the Executive from being able to
respond to new needs in a timely and efficient manner. We would there-
fore suggest that the requirement for the identification of program
needs not be legislated but allowed to evolve, as required, to meet the
needs of both the executive branch and the Congress.
Superficially, reformulating the structure of the budget to high-
light national needs appears to be a reasonable objective. However,
the ramifications of such action on both the executive and legislative
branches of the Government would be staggering. The reformulation
of the Federal budget to present existing and proposed budget author-
ity and outlays in terms of a hierarchy of national needs could necessi-
tate a massive reorganization of existing departments and agencies in
order to facilitate administration of programs funded on the basis of
national needs. This, in turn, could mandate a far reaching reorganiza-
tion of congressional appropriation committee structure. While Ave
agree in principle to identifying resources by program, we believe that
there would be less disruption to the operation of programs and the
Federal Government as a whole, if the change to a program budget
were implemented on an incremental basis starting wir' fj,e cunvnt
budget structure as a base. This procedure might be teas. . Tin- dead-
lines for implementation prescribed in the bill are totally unrealistic
Enactment of S. 1414. as written, could also raise certain legal issue-
in terms of its relation to the Budget and Accounting Act. which
requires the President to transmit required budgetary information in
"such form and detail" as he may determine. As is noted above, we
believe that our system of government requireiTtliaixlie President *.-
independence to expresshis judgment in his budget be preserved—
along with the Congress' independence to change the budget. We be-
lieve that it would be a grievous mistake to compromise the independ
ence of either by adopting a priority-setting system like that winch
S. 1414 proposes.
In summary, if the primary intent is to provide additional infor-
mation to improve congressional budgetary decisionmaking, we don't
believe the bill is needed in light of the provisions of S. 1541.
On the other hand, if the intent is to reformulate the structure of tin
budget document, we would strongly oppose the enactment of >. 1414
in its present form.
Sincerely.
Wilfred H. Rommel.
Assistant Director for LeQtslntire Reference.
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APPENDIX D - Letter to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
from Senators Bellman and Muskie Dated
November 3, 1976
The" Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
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the 19/4 Budget Control and Impoundment Act,
government-wide presentations of agency mission
he Fiscal Year 1979 budget. T[]e. J^enate Budget
sly this spring, however, that the Department
e a mission area budget for Fiscal Year 1978
budget submission. The Committee members
information is needed to provide (1) a framework
debate of the defense budget and its relationship
policy and defense requirements, and (2) ex-
mission budgets prior to government-wide
seal Year 1979 requirement.
A request for a display of this nature for the Fiscal Year 1977
budget was made directly to you. Although your Department did prepare
the'information in the form requested by the Defense Task Force of
the Senate Budget Committee, the data was not made available to the
Committee.
We are familiar with several concerns of the DoD with regard to
submission of mission budget data. A listing of these concerns and the
position of the Senate Budget Committee regarding each of them follows:
(1) DoD. A mission budget requires statistical allocation
of data by use of algorithms, and the product is not
derived directly from the DoD accounting system.
Senate Buda^t_Comniittee. The use of statistical allocation
algorithms is expected and acceptable to the Committee.
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(2) DoD. A mission budget requires allocation of fixed
as well as variable costs which ir.ay invite an
unjustified conclusion that a cut in divisions
permits a proportionate cut in allocated support
activities.
Senate Budget Committee. It is our opinion that to
be totally meaningful, fixed costs must also be allo-
cated. However, the Budget Committee does not
recommend specific cuts or increases in such things
as divisions or wings. That is the responsibility
of the authorization and Appropriations Committees.
(3) DoD. A mission budget provides data useful for
macro-analytical purposes but not for financial
control due to the allocation requirements.
Senate Budget Committee. The Budget Committee evaluates
budget data in macro-analytical terms.
(4) DoD. Submission of mission budget information for
Fiscal Year 1978 introduces mission categories
before views of 0MB have been considered.
Senate Budget Committee. The Committee recommends
that as the requested information is prepared, the
DoD discuss the effort with 0MB, and the Committee
staff will also work with 0MB in this regard.
(5) DoD . A mission budget provides data that could be
misunderstood or misused.
Senate Budget Conmittee . The Committee staff believes it
thoroughly understands the DoD budgetary system,
and there is little likelihood that a misunderstanding
or misuse of the data would be made by the Committee.
A mission area structure that would serve the Committee's needs
is enclosed. The mission categories represent an effort to meet the
Committee's needs and at the same time accommodate current DoD accounting





t.'e believe that our requirement is a reasonable one and, further,
that our objectives and intended use of the data should alleviate your
prior concerns regarding the submission of the information. It is re-
quested that the data be provided no later than January 28, 19/7.
'•'essrs. Tom Dine and Bob Snood (224-05S3) are the points of contact on
our staff for this requirement.
Sincerely,










3. Coiibfiand 9 Control and Communications
Tactical l.'arfare
4. land Warfare




- Close Air Support (includes relevant Marine air forces)
- Air Superiority/Interdiction (includes relevant Marine air forces)
6. Naval Warfare
- Force Projection (includes relevant defense and resupply forces)
- Amphibious Operations
- Area Sea Control (sea lane defense)
7. Tactical Mobility
Defens e-wide Forces an d Support
8. Intelligence
9. Communications




NOTE: Defense-wide support (training, logistics, base and personnel
support, etc.) are allocated to the first level categories
within the Strategic, Tactical find Defense-wide areas, e.g.,
(1) Strategic Offensive, (4) land Warfare, or (9) Communications.
Baseline DoD Program - Subtotal






COMPOSITION OF DiriNSE MISSION BUDGET STRUCTURE CATEGORIES
Fnch uf L!ie defense mission budget categories are divided into missions and
sub missions, as follows:
Strategic Warfare
1. Strategic offensive forces include ICBMs, Sl.BMs, and bombers.
*
2. Strategic defensive forces include surveillance and warning systems,
aircraft interceptor units, and ABMs.
3. Strategic command, control, and communications include both offensive
and defensive comnand and control systems.-
Ta c t ic a 1 Wa r
f
are
4. land warfare forces include both light (including Marine ground forces)
(and heavy ground divisions, and other combat forces, including air defense
and relevant combat support forces.
5. Air warfare includes close air support and air superiority/interdiction
forces, including relevant Marine air forces.
6. Naval warfare includes forces for:
- force projection which includes carriers, their escorts, and resupply
forces and related aircraft squadrons;
- amphibious operations which includes LHAs, LSDs, LSTs, minesweepers, etc.
area sea control which includes patrol frigates, other escorts available





7. Tactical mobility includes airlift and seal i ft forces, but not amphibious
lift which has been placed under Naval force projection.
Ddfense-jvjde Forces and Support
8. Intelligence (self-explanatory)
9. Contnunications (self-explanatory)
10. Technology base R&D includes only that research which is basic (program
61000). The remainder of R & D is allocated to appropriate missions.
11. Defense-wide management, which is headquarters support.
Defense-wide support activities such as training, logistics, base,
and personnel support, etc., are allocated to the first level mission
area categories; e.g., strategic offensive forces, air warfare forces,
naval warfare forces, etc.
Costs not providing U.S. defense capability
These categories are for retired pay and interna tional aid , which do
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Department of Defense budget.
As x s eo the tas,, ahead
of us we^-c- ^c^co.
in the way we approach,
analyze,
national defense function:
(1) a ,„,«; ^^-^'^^^aL^^ponrpr^s;-: '





^ i r-c+- . commit
ourselves- to a , pol.it ±Z2±^c^tt^l^AsZi v i c c s_a nd
^-cTsion-makina,to h . "" I - by
™o
"J ^grTSSrTantlV. «e
Appropriations Com., i I ' ' " Z^ituuiLy to have the budget
marforecloso our unique opportu
nit
for 0>;am ,nlng
CoLittee provice for t^"^,,^ and strategy which.











To summarize my suggestion, I believe it would be
advantageous for the Committee to report and D usti.y the .:,..
concurrent resolution's national defense budget levels
by





plus other "overhead" categories which cannot
legitimately
be allocated to defense missions. By so doing,
I believe
we can provide a welcome and much needed connection
be ween
,
congressional judgments on defense policy and budget allocations
tailored to reflect those judgments. \ ..-
More specifically, I think it would be appropriate
to :"
begin to develop specific information now so that
^e can orient
our discussion with Secretary Schlesmger when he
appears before
the Committipe on March 14.
After a presentation of the international situation, , ;
defense policy and strategy and foreign commitments,
we could :
then proceed to discuss each mission as follows:
(1) How the mission relates to defense strategy




Current and projected levels of mission _ .
capabilitv in relation to expected threat le/els,
The case for increasing or decreasing mission
capability and, hence, the need to phase out
major acquisition programs or the cost, time and ,
capability goals for new ones,;
Total mission costs, including historical
trends'
and future projections. Included in S'ach mission




















related operation and maintenance costs;
related construction costs;
related acquisition programs ( researcn,
development, test and evaluation and
procurement costs)
;





















the °.2-member emission on Government Procurement.
reformer member?! 1 convinced that the Commission was, . ,.
unfortunately, correct in its finding
that
.
•Vonaress and its committees have become
enmeshed at-a







r s onsibie rofexecutihg programs and ,
i,,-»i ronaress view of related higher-order issues
of
national priorities'and the -allocation
of national resources.
"Concress should have an early and
"comprehensive opportunity
to donatTa-nd understand any
^s^o^s a^goals^
.




with national priorities. - .
•
I would be happy to discuss this
approach with you further
-
and have my staff lend assistance. ,






WARHEN O. MASNUSON, WASH.
FRANK E. MOSS. UTAH
WALTER F. MONDILE. MINN.
ERNEST F. HOLLING3. S.C
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIF.
LAWTON CHILES. FLA.
JAMES ABOUREZK, S. OAK.
JOSEPH R. BIOEN, JR., DEL,
SAM NUNN, GA.
DOUGLAS J. BENNET, JR., STAFF DIRECTOR
JOHN T. MC EVOY. CHIEF COUNSEL




J. GLENN BEALL. JR., MO.
JAMES L. BUCKLEY. N.Y.
JAMES A. MC CLURE. IDAHO
PETE V. OOMENICI, N. MEX.
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I was delighted and encouraged to receive your
letter of March 10 on the steps which the Budget Com-
mittee should take in reviewing the Budget of the
Department of Defense. It goes straight to the heart
of the problem facing the Committee in considering all
of the functional areas of the budget.
I share your concern that the Committee should,
on the whole, avoid a "line-item" approach to budgetary.
issues. And I agree that the Committee should seek to
provide in its work a forum, as you express it, "for
e XjiirLin i ng h ighpr-nrdpr dpr.jsjpns of defense policy. "
I find your suggestion that the Committee structure its
work on the Defense budget around mission objectives
and mission costs a constructive and attractive alterna-
tive.
I am concerned that this year we will be con-
strained by time and resources in such a way that we
will not be able fully to develop and analyze a mission
framework for our decisions on Defense. But I believe
we should begin to work toward such a goal.
With best wishes,'! am
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As you may know, Chairman Muskie has organized
several Budget Committee Task Force groups to work on the
upcoming budget cycle. The Defense Task Force has decided
to break down its work agenda into several key areas under
the leadership of the Task Force members.
Senator Chiles has agreed to take the lead in
development of a mission-oriented defense budget presenta-
tion, as agreed to by the full Committee in its report on
the first Concurrent Resolution (Senate Report 94-77, 15
April 1975, page 44)
.
This letter is to req uest that the Defense
Department begin as soon as possible to work with the
S e ri'ate staff to d QX^2^2l~^dS]lI^~~^^^y^ p.re s entati ojl. Please
c o o r
d
i riaT e~"thi s effo rt t h r_ough
.
_S e nator Ch-ilft's-' rpprRSp.n t a -
t
i
ve, Mr. Lester A. Fettig.
Mr. Michael Joy will be responsible for the
overall coordination of this and other work projects for
the Defense Task Force.
I am






Abraham rjbicopp. conn., chairman luKouMirrtii
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL SPENDING PRACTICES,
EFFICIENCY. AND OPEN GOVERNMENT
(202) 224-4211
(PURSUANT TO SEC. 7. 8. RES. it. J«TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20810
December 8, 1975





In a July 18, 1975 letter to Secretary Schlesinger, the
Senate Budget Committee requested the cooperation of the
Department of Defense in developing a defense budget display
for use by the committee in considering the 1977 budget
resolution.
During consideration of the 1976 resolution, the committee
found that a presentation of the defense budget by missions,
with the allocation of support and RDT&E to those missions, was
very useful. As a result*, one of the objectives of the
Committee Defense Task Force, of which I am a member, has been
to develop our requirement in advance of our consideration of
the next Presidential Budget, so that your Comptroller would
have adequate time to prepare the necessary tables.
In this regard my staff has been meeting with OSD to
review the methodology by which the defense budget is
structured, and to clarify our needs. It is not our intention
to create needless additional displays of the defense budget,
and for this reason we have given careful consideration to the
current organization of the Five Year Defense Plan and the
fiscal guidance categories now in use as a point of departure








The attached table provides a mission structure which
would serve the committee's needs to properly consider the
defense function. Key to the value of this display is that
training, medical, general support, and RDT&E would be allocated
within the missions listed.
The Senate Budget Committee would use this display to provide
a context for our consideration of major defense issues. In order
to fully grasp the financial commitment to particular mission
functions, it is most important that related support be allocated
to mission areas.
While consideration of the mission budgets will provide
valuable guidance for the Committee's decisions, it is my under-
standing the committee's final recommendation to the Senate for the
defense function will remain at the level of aggregation as was
the case for 1976. In any case, we fully realize that the alloca-
tion of support to missions would be accomplished by statistical .
algorithms, and that your accounting system is not structured to
allow you to be governed by guidance at the mission level.
Our Defense Task Force will be reporting its recommendations
to the full committee shortly. Consequently, we would appreciate
receiving a functional display of the 1976 President's Defense
Request as soon as possible, and a similar display reflecting final
congressional action on the FY 76 request, after you have had
an opportunity to review that action.
Thank you for your cooperation and support. Please have
your staff contact Mr. Les Fettig at 224-0211 for further infor-












• Strategic command, control and communication
Tactical Warfare
o Sea control
- Naval projection and sea control





















aTHE SECRETARY OK DEFENSE
WASHINGTON O C. 20301
Jam 1 1975
Honorable Law con Chiles
Unicecl Staccs Senate ;
Dear Senator Chiles:
As you know, my staff has been working closely with yours' on our response
to your request of December S, 1975, for a "mission-oriented" budget;
display for the President's FY 1976 request. In fact, the process was
started last summer in response to the July 18, 1975 letter from Senator
Hollings on the same subject.
Over the month s we have made available the complete -details.—of our program
d.own to the program element, which is the . b.as ic. bn-i 1 ding..hip ck.r nf—Don ' s
planning, programming and budgeting system. We have also made frank
disclosure of the flexibilities and limitations which exist within the
present system insofar as our capability to reallocate to your suggested
mission structure is concerned.
We have also had discussions -with the Office of Management and Budget and
with the staffs of the various interested Congressional Committees, includ-
ing the Budget Committees, on the various possible responses to Section 601
of Public Law 93-344, the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. This provision
requires that the federal budget for FY 1979 be submitted on a mission
basis . As vnn car; appreciate t_. this, will.. re,quire..-de^inXtlQDJJ3X^Lhe views
and needs of the various Congress ional„ Comm it tees as
r
well, as other ag,en c ie s
within the executive branch.
Notwithstanding these longer range objectives, it is our intention to be
responsive to your near-term requirements. Terence Z ,. . ^Icdary....- thp. Dftfen-.e
Comptrol ler, "is prepared J:o j^rjrj^ith^vou and
i
Les.t.e:
st'aff to make sure your nead^jixe met.
a-LS "'' your
I can assure you we have a common objective in seeking a key to better under-
standing of our budget requirements each year, and we look forward to working
with you in this regard. - *
03
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COMMITTEE OH THE DUDGET
ooucmi j. Briber, j«., staff oimfcto«
k>nn t. uccvor. chief ccxinml WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510








Thank you for your letter of January 10 indicating your
desire to work with the Senate Budget Committee toward meeting our
budget information requirements.
Last year, during consideration of the defense function
budget, the committee determined that a mission approach should be
pursued for 1977 to provide a framework for assessing the total
resources devoted to each major defense mission. The goal, simi-
larly proposed by former Secretary Schlesinger, recommended: to
raise the level of congressional debate above distracting, piecemeal
issues and instead concentrate on fundamental defense priorities
and capabilities.
As a result of discussions with Mr. McClary and his staff,
we have come to an agreement that a mission budget presentation
could be presented by the Defense Department in the format sub-
mitted to you. This format is more detailed than that provided
to the committee last year. However, it conforms rather closely
to the structure now used by OSD for its own fiscal guidance.







After careful consideration, ve have concluded that this
display, along with relevant back up material, would provide the
committee with important insight into the relationship between
defense policies and resource allocation. As a result, we feel
compelled to repeat the request that you provide sucli a mission
budget display for FY 1977, along with rclated__br.e_uhP-Uts an d, trends
by February 9 for our review for the defense function.
We realize that there is uncertainty in how to best allo-
cate elements of overhead to specific missions, and questions on how
to best redefine the missions themselves. For now, however, we are
prepared to structure the missions to take account of the existing
defense categories* and to accept your best estimates of Program 7
and 8 allocations even though they may not be of the same quality
as other budget estimates. We are convinced that our experience
will be helpful in preparing for the required government-wide
presentation of agency mission budgets as called for in the 197-+
Budget Control and Impoundment Act, section 60l(i), beginning
with fiscal year 1979-
We look forward to your continued interest and support.
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
MAR 6 1976
Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
Chairman, Defense Task Force
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This letter is in response to your January 22 request for a
display of the FY 77 President's Budget for Defense by
"Defense Mission Structure."
All of us a
programs an
wh ich is ac
objectives .
case of str
for a st rat








re working on the problem of explainin
d expenditures to the American people
curate, clear, and relatable to nation
The task seems to be relatively easy
ategic nuclear forces. Over the years
egic deterrent has been appreciated by
egic systems are almost entirely singl
U.S. nuclear forces perform can be re
e counterpart on the Soviet side and a
ch is enough?" question is, at least,
ind of parity or equivalence with the
ey lead in throwweight and total megat
bers of reentry vehicles and warheads












conce ivab le .
Soviet Union
onna ge , we
and in accu-
The situation is not so sharply focused with respect to the
multi-purpose elements of our military capability. They must
interact with the multi-purpose forces around the world...
those of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviets alone, Mid-East countries,
Asian nations, and emerging powers throughout the world. We
talk of broad missions for our general purpose forces, but we
realize they must do anything and everything the strategic
nuclear forces cannot do.
As I indicated in my letter to Senator Chiles on January 10,
I want to be responsive to the requirements of the Budget





t hat. I shoved you the FY 77 Budget in conventional terms --
by major appropriations title -- and then in terms of the ten
major programs used within DoD to relate resources to outputs
or missions .
Yo u will recall that five of the ten DoD programs ($65 bill ion
QfJirTrT7TrTnTlo, n ,Mt'o£'arin FV Tn ar e force- or mTsTioT^
or len ted --straT e g lc forces, gene ral p u r p o_s e___f_o.r c_e, g^_^JjLE,£ 1 1 i -
gence !Tn^~cl5^mlIn~i c a"TTo n"s , airlift and sea 1 i_f_t
, __
a n d_G u a r, d , a n.d
Reserve Fb r c e s -- a n d V ft e b t h er five include a broad support
-
i . , .
-
i an-" _- rTiT l - i "- - m—"*—! T-T i i' 7 " l i ll I ! — 1 1 IX WiM ni lWW II H I f WWW I il"- -" 1 -^ -*« —
base for those forces or functions. Over the past decade, DoD
has successively refined its program element structure to allo-
cate as much support to missions and forces as has seemed
reasonable .
The result is a Defense mission structure which presents a
picture quite different from the degree of resource allocation
your letter requested, but which has a validity by virtue of
wide understanding of the allocation details -- both within
DoD and without -- and it serves us well.
Thusj after careful consideration of where we are with respect
to formal submission of a new display, I conclude that changing
to the format you suggested could cause considerable confusion
and misunderstanding with respect to the FY 77 Budget, possibly
detracting from the substantive discussion of defense issues
which we both seek.
1 1 is my view, therefore , t h a t 1 s[ hjsnol. d[n con t lnue to pr esent and
j U*Lt i f y the Defens e budg et to the C ojn g r e s_sMb y the ap p ropria^ ion
structure and major program categories already...used, withi n DoD.
We^ will continue to wo rk wit h you,_ the other Congressional
Committees, Congressional Budget Office, and Office of Manage-
ment and Budget to determine how this program structure should
be revised to meet the requirements of Section 601 of P.L. 93-344





















APPENDIX F - Letters Sent between HASC and HBC
Concerning the Proposed Defense Departmen'
Supplemental for FY 1977
cli.£). Incuse of ScpreScntatibr*
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a Honorable Brock Adams
^
Ch3iiT«n, ttorittee on^tne budgeu




I a* forwarding a copy of H
R-^ —
:-r Bob Wilson, Kesnbers 01 u..s U>.
,-nJ-r.n^-iced by Kr. 5ennet<
I I I v,
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is bill r
FY 1977 Supple-and Mr. h nfi
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s
the Naval shipbuilding po
mo of uje Pre>i ^ Congp355
rental Authorization request
v.Men ..a
on Auoost 23, 1976.
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concurrent resolution on the
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and Critical Material —r
-----
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as Chain^n of the Conmfttee on the Budget, you would oppose
the granting of a rule based on emergency conditions and
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OCLQCRT L. LATTA. GW'O
CLFORO A. CECt<»?EVC. MICH.
Kr»«u( t. icHMCcaru, pa.
JAMLS T. Bf'JTMIlU N C.
DEL CLAWSCN. CALtF.
GARNER C. Smbi.lB. KAN5
OA*B£B B CCtABLC. JR.. N.V.







Committee on Armed Services
U.S. Hcjse of Representatives
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in reply to your letter of September 15 asking for my
position on H.R. 15378, a proposed supplemental for the Navy's ship-
building program.
Section 402 of Public Law 93-344 requires that all authorization bills
be reported on or before May 15 preceding the beginning of the fiscal
year to which they apply. It is my understanding that the supplemental
request which you are asking me to consider includes ships which were
included in your original authorization bill and rejected by the Congress.
It is doubtful that the request would have been rejected had there been a
real emergency. This supplemental request simply asks the Congress to
reverse its decision.
Section 402 of Public Law 93-344 provides that no authorization
reported after May 15 may be considered in the House absent an emergency
waiver. The House Budget Committee has generally opposed granting
waivers for authorization bills reported after May 15. In view of the
fact that these ships have already been considered and rejected by the
Congress this year and no clear emergency exists, I, as Chairman of
the Budget Committee, would oppose any waiver of the required reporting
date under Section 402(a) of the Budget Act.
Should a waiver be requested, I will of course convene a meeting
of the Budget Committee to consider a recommendation to the Rules Com-
mittee. I am enclosing a copy of a letter to Chairman Madden of the










APPENDIX G - Adm. Rickover Comment of "On Watch" Taken
from Testimony before the SAC May 5, 1976
Senator Xuxx. I am jotting: around to this point. And I don't
want to get into personalities here, but I really do think this is impor-
tant, because there is an awful lot of conversation.
Admiral Zumwalt has written a book, and in that book he says
—
and I quote him :
Rickover has been workins successfully toward a subsurface Navy, aud so
it is partly his doing that for L'O years the Navy has been getting smaller.
Admiral Rickover. That is right : the cockroaches always come from
the neighbor's apartment.
Senator Nrxx. I agree with you on that statement too. Do you have
anything specific to say ?
Admiral Rickover. Have you had that experience, too?
Senator Xuxx. I have that same experience. Do you think that is
a logical allegation ? You are saying here that you prefer quality
rather than numbers. And that is what Admiral Zumwalt is saying
that you do.
Admiral Rickover. I will answer that question in the same manner
that I answered it on Good Friday. A female broadcaster called me
from one of the leading TV stations. She said she wanted me to
comment on what Admiral Zumwalt, said. I agreed. She said. "Now. I
have got you on the tape." The Hrst question she asked was: Have you
read Admiral Zumwalt "s book?"
And I said. "No."
And she said. "I can't hear you."
And I said, "I am sorry, I am munching my Easter roll now." So
I repeated my answer.
And then she asked me the first question : "What do you think of
such and such a statement?"
And I said. "Well, this is a free country and Admiral Zumwalt
is entitled to his opinion."
She asked the second question. And I said, "Well this is a free
country, and he is entitled to his opinion."
And this went on. And she said. "Is that the only answer you are
going to give?"
And I said: "Well, you can ask a thousand questions and that is
all the answer you will get."
And she said. ''You apparently don't want to answer."
And I said. "That is up to you. I will keep giving that, answer as
long as you want.*'
I will not get into any arguments, for a man who can't accomplish
what he wants to always finds fault with others rather than himself.
Senator Nrxx. I don't want to get into an argument either. But.
the essential question we have got to decide is nuclear versus non-nu-
clear, smaller ships versus the larger ships and numbers versus quality.
That is the essential question. Two experts. Admiral Zumwalt on
one hand and you on the other hand, are in fundamental disagree-
ment, and a lot of people in the Navy are fundamentally in disagree-
ment and a lot of the people in the administration are in fundamental
disagreement, it makes it very difficult for Congress, at least me. to
make a rational decision.

Admiral Rickover. I think you are just as intelligent as any naval
officer, sir.
Mr. Leightox. May I make one comment.
Senator Nrxx. Yes. sir.
Mr. Leightox. If you like we would be glad to provide for tlio
record statements made by Admiral Zumwalt when he was Chief of
Naval Operations in which he testified to the Congress that he con-
sidered an all-nuclear task force would have a greater ability to pene-
trate and counter the Soviet threat than any other surface force we
know how to build, and he stated that CVX 70. the nuclear-powered
aircraft carrier Carl Vinson, was the first priority item in the general
purpose, forces budget in fiscal 1074. which was the year in which tin-
ship was authorized, and he stated that we should build at least one
nuclear escort a year.
I would be glad to cite those for the record.
Senator Xrxx. I think that would be very helpful.
[The information referred to follows:]
Excerpts Fbom Statements by Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Elmo R.
Zumwalt, Jr.. Published in the Jotnt Committee on Atomic Energy
Record of "Hearing and Subsequent Inquiry of the Subcommittee on
Military Applications on Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Warships"
Dated May 5, 1971
—




APPENDIX H - A Comment on What Typically Occurs to the
Agency Attempting to Implement PPBS by
Aaron Wi Idavsky
THE CALCULATIONS IN PROGRAM BUDGETING
I have previously argued that program budgeting would
run up against severe political difficulties. While most of
thpsp arguments h ave been conceded. I have been told that
in. a better world, without the vulgar intrusion of political
factors (such as the consent of the governed i, PPBS would
perform its wonders as advertised. Now it is clear that for
the narrow purpose of predicting why program budgeting
would not work there was no need to mention political
problems at all. It would have been sufficient to say that
the wholesale introduction of PPBS presented insuperable
difficulties of calculation. All the obstacles previously men-
tioned, such as lack of talent, theory, and data, may be
summed up in a single statement: no one knows how to do
program budgeting. Another way of putting it would be to
Say jkafciBamJfflfla what nrnoram hnHc^mo Oinnld be lilre
in general, but no one knows what it should be in am par-
ticular
i
case._P_rogram budgeting cannot be stated in opera-
tional tenn^_There is np^ agreement on what th e words
mean, let alone an ability to show another person what
should be done. The reason for the difficulty is that telling
an agencv to adopt program budgeting means telling it to
find better policies and there is no formula for doing that.
One can i^and should) talk about measuring effectiveness,
estimating costs, and comparing alternatives, but that is a
far cry from being able to take the creative leap of formu-
lating a better policy.
On the basis of numerous discussions with would-be prac-
titioners of program budgeting at the federal level, I think I
caxi describe the usual pattern of events. The instructions
come down from, the Bureau of the Budget. You must have
^ pjjs^rain budget. Agencv personnel hit the panic button.
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just do not know how to do what thev have been
asked to do. They turn, if thev can, to the pitifulh' small
band of refugees from the Pentagon who have come to light
the wav. But these Defense intellectuals do no t know much
about the policy area in which thev are working. That takes
time. Yet something must quickly come.out^of all_jhis. So
thpy procure a vast amount of inchoate information char-
acterized by premature quantification of irrelevant items.
Neither the agency head nor the examiners in the Bureau
of the Budget can comprehend the material submitted to
them. Its very bulk inhibits understanding. It is useless to
the Director of the Budget in making his decisions. In an
effort to be helpful, the program analysis unit at the Budget
Bureau savs something like, "Nice try, fellows; we appreci-
ate all that effort. But you have not quite got the idea of
program budgeting yet. Rpmpmhf vnn mncf Harifv poaU
d efine obj ective ffi]atS thSSfi fn nnantitaHYp indira fors.
project mst^ intn <-Vip fnt-m-P Pi^c^> cpnri a new submission
based on this understanding."
Another furious effort takes place. Incredible amounts of
overtime are put in. Ultimately, under severe time pressure,
even more data are accumulated. No one will be able to say
that agency personnel did not tryjiard. The new presenta-
tion makes a little more sense to some people and a little
less to others. It just does not hang together as a presenta-
tion of agencv policies. There are more encouraging words
from the Budget Bureau and another sermon about specify-
ing alternative ways of meeting agency objectives, though
not, of course, taking the old objectives for granted. By this
time agency personnel are desperate. "We would love to do
it." thev say, "but we cannot figure out the right way. You
experts in the Budget Bureau should show us how to do it.
"
Silence. The word from on high is that the Bureau of the
Budget does not interfere with agency operations; it is the
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APPENDIX I - Letter from Senator Stennis to Senator
Chiles Concerning Mission Budgeting
Dated January 4, 1977
, , .1 ,
Mono ra bio !.;nvtn,i Ch i 1 os
I J p. i t ed S*. a t os Sena t o
IV a si; : no ton
, I). CI.
[!ea r So iK: t o r Ch i 1 e :
In :i.,;.i .i >'v)iir continuing interest and our
;i rev i ous joiive rsa t i ens on the subject o[ miss inn
budgeting, ! I'! .;,,,V you ivould be interested that
the \rmed Services Committee this year is us In i>
.i i":ev% format ! o r its hearings on the overall
defense budget ana program.
iii i s nev. !- : ual includes sever-al hearings on
so:in. :i . the :naj > r mission areas in the lie lease
Department as described by the enclosed outline.
1 bei ieve this approach would be consistent with
ir thinkiiK; and should enable the Committee, to
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1. Posture Statement Sc».". i'oLiu'y i) i I''.- i «• .1 :, v ; ("ha i imaa
,
Jo i 11 t Ch i < 1 . i) 1 '". 1 .i i i
Overall Defense Budget Preparation -- budget coi:,uu:A lion,
t r ends, infl .i ! ion, p r i o r i 1 1 e s
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Sirategic Nuclear Force Posture -- Air Force, Navy, Office
oi tl.e Joint Cuiefs of Staff, Office
of "Sccrolary of D e f e n s e .
4. Maritime Post ure -- Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office
of Secretary of Defense.
S. NATO Posture Army, Air Force, Navy, Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Office of Secretary of
Defense
6. Military Force Summary -- Service Chiefs of Staff jointly
7. Military Department Management -- policies, efficiency,
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